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ABSTRACT

Restitution following mass dispossession is often considered both ideal
and impossible. Why? This Article identifies two previously unnamed
paradoxes that undermine the possibility of restitution: the time-unworthiness
paradox and the collective responsibility paradox.
After developing these ideas, the Article examines them in the context
of a particularly difficult and intractable case of dispossession and restitution.
The Article draws upon interviews with restitution claimants whose stories
reveal the paradoxes of restitution.

*
Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks to Joe Singer, Hanoch Dagan,
Al Brophy, Johanna Kammerlander, Alzbeta Pezoldova, Rudiger von Pezold, Jan Kuklik, Ondrej
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THE PARADOXES OF RESTITUTION'

Introduction

The restitution of property rights can pose an intractable challenge.2
This Article identifies two previously unnamed paradoxes at the heart of
restitution claims that often make restitution impossible. First, both
dispossession and restitution depend on the social construction of rightsworthiness. Over time, people once considered unworthy of property rights
"become" worthy of them. However, time also corrodes the practicality and
moral weight of restitution claims. By the time the dispossessed "become"
worthy of property rights, restitution claims are no longer practically or morally
viable. This is the time-unworthiness paradox.
Second, restitution claims are undermined by the concept of collective
responsibility. People are sometimes dispossessed because collective
responsibility is unjustly imposed on them for wrongs committed by a few
members of a group. But restitution may require the dispossession of innocent
current occupiers of land-thus imposing a type of collective responsibility on
them. Therefore, restitution can be seen as committing the very wrong it
purports to right. This is the collective responsibility paradox.
Both paradoxes can be overcome, but only if we recognize the rightsworthiness of others before time fatally corrodes the viability of restitution. We
must also draw a careful distinction between the imposition of collective rightsunworthiness, which results in the mass dispossession of others, and the
voluntary acceptance of collective responsibility, which results in the restitution
of others.

I

Although "[t]he return of property, homes and land has been viewed as a means of
redressing past injustice in many forms, ranging from communist nationalizations and colonialera land confiscation to outright ethnic cleansing and war crimes," there is no broad consensus on
definitions of terms such as "restitution" and "reparations." RHODRI C. WILLIAMS, INT'L CTR.
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, Executive Summary to THE CONTEMPORARY RIGHT TO PROPERTY
RESTITUTION IN
THE
CONTEXT
OF TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
(2007),
available at

http://www.lobkovi.czlRestPub_07.pdf. For purposes of this Article, restitution is a remedy for
an unjust dispossession that includes either restoration to ownership of the specific property lost,
or reparations in lieu of such ownership. Reparations can include monetary compensation,
acknowledgements, apologies, symbolic gestures, and other amends. An unjust dispossession is a
past dispossession of property rights that violates our contemporary norms ofjustice.
2

See, e.g., LEtLA HILAL, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

RESPONSES TO PALESTINIAN DISPOSSESSION: FOCUS ON RESTITUTION (Brookings-LSE Project on

Internal Displacement, 2012), available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-BrookingsDisplacement-Palestine-CaseStudy-2012-English.pdf; Charles Philpott, Though the Dog is Dead,
the Pig Must be Killed: Finishing with Property Restitution to Bosnia-Herzegovina'sIDPs and
Refugees, 18 J. REFUGEE STUD. 1 (2005); Deniz Senol Sert, Cyprus: Peace, Return andProperty,
23 J. REFUGEE STUD. 238 (2010).
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The Social ConstructionofPropertyRights- Unworthiness

Restitution analyses usually take the injustice of past dispossessions of
property as a given and focus on whether restitution is now possible.3 But
previous generations did not consider those dispossessions unjust.
Contemporary accounts show that mass dispossessions were often seen as a
means of righting a wrong, by transferring property rights from people
unworthy of them to people worthy of them.4 It is tempting to scoff at these
accounts, crediting them to disingenuous greed. But it is a mistake to assume
that accounts we find unlikely are disingenuous. We don't have to believe that
previous generations acted justly to believe that they believed they acted justly.
The question, then, is what has changed, that dispossessions that seem so
clearly unjust now were not considered unjust then?
Perhaps today people are more just through a type of moral evolution,
but that seems unlikely. 5 If we are not more just, then perhaps our preferred
techniques of injustice have changed, and we are no longer willing to commit
massive dispossessions. But recent conflicts throughout the world clearly say
otherwise.6 More likely, what has changed is neither our moral character nor
See, for example, the powerful opening words of Jeremy Waldron's Superseding Historic
Injustice: "The history of white settlers' dealings with the aboriginal peoples of Australia, New
Zealand, and North America is largely a history of injustice. People, or whole peoples, were
attacked, defrauded, and expropriated; their lands were stolen and their lives were ruined. What
are we to do about these injustices?" Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103
ETHICs 4, 4 (1992), available at http://www.polthought.cam.ac.uk/seminars/intros20082009/Waldron-Superseding-Historic-Injustice.pdf
4
For example, as Avery Kohler has demonstrated, contemporary accounts at the time that
colonial powers were dispossessing indigenous peoples of enormous amount of land in North
America and Australia make clear that for many influential thinkers of the time, "dispossession
of itself is not wrong"; rather, "resisting dispossession is wrong." Avery Kohlers, The Lockean
Efficiency Argument and Aboriginal Land Rights, 78 AuSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 391, 391 (2000).
Swiss Philosopher Emerich de Vattel, then regarded as perhaps the leading light in the growing
field of international law, argued in his work The Law of Nations that indigenous people had no
just claim to property against "other nations, more industrious and too closely confined." Stuart
Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology andProperty Law in Early Australia,23 LAW & HIST.
REv. 95, 100 (2005) (quoting EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAWOFNATIONS (1758)).
Of course, one need only look at the astonishing bloodletting in the past two decades in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to question whether our moral character is evolving.
6
See, e.g., ELIZABETH FERRIS & KIMBERLY STOLTZ, THE BROOKINGS INST., MINORITIES,
DISPLACEMENT
AND
IRAQ'S
FUTURE
(2008),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/1223 minorities ferris/1223 minorities
ferris.pdf (describing massive displacements resulting from Iraq war); John Hagan & Joshua
Kaiser, The Displaced and the Dispossessed of Darfur: Explaining the Sources of a Continuing
State-Led Genocide, 62 BRIT. J. Soc. 1 (2011) (describing massive dispossessions of residents of
Darfur resulting from conflict with Sudanese government); Alexandre Kedar, The Legal
Transformationof Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and the PalestinianLandholder 1948-1967,
33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 923 (2001) (describing Palestinian refugee crisis resulting from the
1948 and 1967 Israeli-Arab wars); THE MIDDLE EAST INST., Iraq's Refugee and IDP Crisis:
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our willingness to commit mass dispossessions. Rather, what has changed is
simply our belief about who is worthy of property rights-respect and who is
not.
That belief has changed because it is socially constructed. A belief is
socially constructed when it is dependent on the "role that that belief plays in
our social lives" 7 rather than the intrinsic characteristics of the object of that
belief. For example, the belief that chickens, but not cats, have feathers is not
socially constructed, because it is based on the intrinsic properties of cats and
chickens. By contrast, the belief that chickens, but not cats, are appropriate to
serve at a dinner party is socially constructed. That belief is not derived from
the intrinsic characteristics of cats and chickens. It is derived from our social
lives. Socially, we have constructed a typology of animals that are appropriate
and inappropriate to serve at a dinner party. "Faced with a potentially confusing
and ambiguous world, we construct cultural categories that impose method and
coherence on our experiences and interactions. We then structure our behavior
around these categories, to avoid disrupting our tacit agreements about who we
are and what we are doing." 8 And it is not just the disapproval of others that
constrains us from serving cats; we are also constrained by our personal,
genuine belief that it is inappropriate to serve cats, because we have
internalized that social construction.
We also socially construct typologies of people.9 The social function of
such beliefs often is a justification for and reinforcement of dominance:
"[g]roups and societies create myths and rationales that justify the dominance
of some groups over others." 0 But it is important to emphasize that social
construction is not a mechanism used self-consciously to establish dominance

Human Toll and Implications, VIEWPOINTS (2008); Rhodri C. Williams, Post-Conflict Property
Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 441
(2005) (discussing displacements resulting from Balkans conflict).
7
Paul A. Boghossian, What is Social Construction?, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 23,
2001, at 2 (200 1); see also PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1991).

Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in
the Social Scientific Study ofLaw, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 475, 484 (1997).
9
See James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic
Identity, 54 INT'L ORG. 845, 848 (2000); see also Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Social
Construction of Target Populations: Implicationsfor Politics and Policy, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
334 (1993). Scholars applying these insights have demonstrated that "gender roles are not
inevitable but are rather the product of social forces," and that racial categories "owe their
existence more to their social function than they do to the scientific evidence." Boghossian, supra
note 7, at 2 (citing SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953); K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY
GUTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE (1996)); lan F. Haney L6pez,
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (1994).
10
DESERVING AND ENTITLED: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (Anne L.
Schneider & Helen Ingram eds., State Univ. of New York Press 2005).
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over some other; rather, it is a cognitive construct that makes an unequal state
of relations between people seem unconstructed and "natural."" Conversely, a
state of social relations that does not reflect these constructions seems
"unnatural." Therefore, a re-arrangement of social relations to a state that
reflects social constructions seems to be righting something that seems
unnatural or wrong.
Property rights are dependent upon our socially constructed beliefs. For
example, we socially construct what types of things may and may not be
property. A window shopper on a city street effortlessly taps into these
constructions. Without conscious thought, she knows that the items displayed
in store windows may become her property, but the sidewalk on which she is
standing may not. The jacket worn by a man who walks past may become her
property, but the man himself may not-today. She may even know, without
conscious thought, that the blood in her veins is her property, but the air in her
lungs is not.
In addition to socially constructing what types of things may be
property, we socially construct what types of people are worthy of property
rights-respect. In some cases, people have been constructed as incapable of
"properly" possessing property. In some cases, people have been constructed as
"outsiders"-those outside the community of people to whom respect for
property rights is due. Often, they have been considered both. Native
Americans, for example, were considered both incapable of properly
possessing property and outside the community of people to whom property
rights-respect was due.
As self-evidently unjust as it may seem today that Native Americans
were dispossessed of wide swaths of the continent, so did it once seem selfevidently unjust to European colonists that Native Americans possessed such
huge tracts of land. First year Property students encounter that strange truth
very early. In Johnson v. M'Intosh,12 Justice John Marshall noted that because
of the "character and habits" of the Native Americans, they could never be
integrated into the community of Europeans, and therefore could never have the
rights due to members of that community.' 3 Although in some circumstances
"new and old members of the society mingle with each other" and "make one
people," Marshall wrote, Native Americans were "savages," and thus not the
type of people who must be included in the community of property rightsrespect.14 Moreover, Native Americans did not possess property properly; to
leave it with them would be "to leave the country a wilderness."

1
12

1
14
15

Id.
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 590.
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Similarly, as Stuart Banner has documented through the diaries and
correspondence of early European arrivals in Australia, the English settler
community quickly decided that the Aboriginal people they encountered in
Australia were not in the category of being worthy of property rights-respect.16
Instead, the settlers argued the Aboriginal people "lived an animal existence,"
were "little better than the beasts," and thus were no more entitled than animals
and beasts to property rights.' 7 As Banner states, "If the Aborigines were still in
the state of nature, then by definition they did not own their land," and
possession of vast swaths of land by such beings was an unnatural state of
affairs that demanded righting. 8
In the cases of both Native Americans and Aboriginal Australians, the
European settlers disapproved of the apparently inefficient ways in which the
original inhabitants used the land. But Europeans who actually used land
inefficiently were not dispossessed; aboriginal people who actually used land
efficiently were not able to avoid dispossession. They were dispossessed not
because of a utilitarian assessment of their actual use of property, but rather
because they were socially constructed as being not the type of people who
were worthy of rights-respect.
Similarly, it was a commonplace of American slavery jurisprudence
that slaves were unworthy of property rights-respect-it was said that a slave,
being property, could not own property. 19 From the perspective of the dominant
white society, slavery was merely the "natural place" for black people who had
"no rights which the white man was bound to respect." 20 As the Supreme Court
explained in its Dred Scott decision, at the time the Constitution was adopted,
"no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute," that whites
were worthy of rights-respect, and blacks were not. 2 1 Because socially
constructed beliefs seem like objective, natural facts, European settlers acted
upon them "habitually ... without doubting for a moment the correctness of
this opinion., 22
The critical role of "outsiderness" in constructions of property rightsworthiness is starkly demonstrated by the contrasting treatment of restitution

16

See Banner, supra note 4, at 101-02.
17
Id at 104, 109 (quoting JOSEPH ORTON, ABORIGINES OF AUSTRALIA 3 (1836), available at
http://digital.slv.vic.gov.au/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1381266718140-296&locale=en
US&metadata object ratio=10&show_metadata-true&preferred usage type=VIEWMAIN&fr
ameld= 1&usePid 1=true&usePid2-true).
18 Banner, supranote 4, at 110.
19 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence:
Chief Justice Roger Taney's Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall's Condemnation of The
Precept ofBlack Inferiority, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1996).
20
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
21

Id

22

Id
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claims by Japanese-Americans and Japanese-Latin-Americans. Even before
World War II, first generation Japanese-American immigrants in Washington
and California were not allowed to own land under those states' "alien land
acts."23 As is now well-known, during the War, Japanese-Americans living on
the west coast of the United States were forced from their homes into
internment camps.24
But the story of Japanese-Latin-Americans interned in the United
States is still practically unknown. In 1942, in Bolivia and Peru, approximately
two thousand Japanese-Latin-Americans who had lived in those countries for
decades were rounded up, handed over to the United States military, and
transported to internment camps in Texas and Louisiana. 2 5 Several decades
after World War II, the socially constructed view of Japanese-Americans as
outsiders unworthy of rights-respect had changed. In 1988, Congress passed the
Civil Liberties Act, by which (as amended in 1992) each Japanese-American
detained during the War received a payment of $20,000, some internees
received compensation for property losses, and the United States formally
apologized for the internments. 2 6 But the Japanese-Latin-Americans who were
kidnapped and interned were excluded under the Act. They, unlike JapaneseAmericans, were still socially constructed as "outsiders." 2 7
Socially constructed beliefs change over time. 28 That is particularly so
with regard to beliefs about who is worthy of rights and who is not. If today we

23

The California Alien Land Law of 1913, which was targeted at Japanese
immigrants,
prevented non-citizens from owning land in California; because Japanese immigrants could not
become citizens under federal law, they could not own land under California law. See Rose
Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, Race and
Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2010). As Justice Murphy acknowledged in his
concurrence in Oyama v. California,the case that ultimately struck down the alien land laws, the
purpose of those laws was to "drive out" the Japanese from California. Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 657 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); see also Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early
Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreigness,"and Racial Hierarchy
in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 274 (1997).
24
The relocations were carried out under Executive Order 9066, with the acquiescence of the
Supreme Court in its notorious Korematsu decision, which upheld the criminal conviction of
Fred Korematsu for refusing to report for deportation to the camps. Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
25
See Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97, 99-106 (1999).
26

MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 100 (1998).

27
Eventually some of the kidnapped Japanese-Latin-Americans reached a settlement with the
United States government. Mochizuki, 43 Fed. Cl. at 98. Under the terms of the settlement, each
member of the plaintiff class received $5,000.
28
"The socially constructed concept of law changes over time, and is best understood as
emerging through a process of continuous construction and reconstruction." Frederick Schauer,
The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 493, 498 (2005), availableat http://www.jstor.org.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/stable/3600679.
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are revolted by the idea that Native Americans, aboriginal Australians,
Japanese-Americans, and others are unworthy of property rights, where once
we were not, it can only be because our socially constructed beliefs about
rights-worthiness have changed. When the social construction of property
rights-worthiness changes, it is not just that the dispossessed are now
considered worthy of property rights-respect; it is that they are now considered
as having been worthy in the past, at the time of their dispossession.
This is true even if socially constructed rights-unworthiness is rooted in
blame, whether appropriate or misplaced. 29 The intensity with which we regard
someone as blameworthy often changes over time. 30 As Jules Coleman
explains, even if one is truly blameworthy for some act, such that ascriptions of
blameworthiness are apt when the act is committed, it seems natural and just to
regard the blameworthy with less resentment and indignation as time passes.3 1
Applying Coleman's insight in the context of dispossession, we can say that
even if our socially constructed beliefs about property rights-worthiness are the
result of resentment and indignation, over time we can and should expect that
resentment and indignation to fade. As a result, we can and should expect the
claims of the dispossessed to resonate with more moral force over time. That is,
of course, even more true if we now view the previous determination of
unworthiness as unfair or incorrect.
C.

The Time-Unworthiness Paradox

Time corrodes the viability of restitution claims. In simple, practical
terms, time seriously deteriorates the functional capacity of legal institutions,
which "typically deal with claims by well-identified victims against wellidentified wrongdoers."3 2 Evidence disappears; historical accounts become less
reliable; parties and witnesses die, and secondary parties with more tenuous
connections to wrongful acts take their place.
As time passes, courts must engage in increasingly speculative
projections from a counterfactual past (imagining the wrongful dispossession
did not occur) into an imaginary present (a world in which the wrongful
dispossession has not occurred), which they are then asked to actually create by
re-arranging social relations. But courts simply cannot know what would have
"Reputations for deservedness are not always permanent, and entitlements do change.
Circumstances may change, thereby discrediting previous ways of thinking about issues." Helen
M. Ingram & Anne L. Schneider, Introduction to DESERVING AND ENTITLED: SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (Helen M. Ingram & Anne L. Schneider eds., State Univ.
of New York Press 2005).
30
See generally Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch, Blameworthiness and Time 3 (Yale Law
Sch.
Pub.
Law
Working
Paper
No.
214,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=1646949.
31
Id.
32
ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON 99 (2006).
29
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happened had some event in history been other than it was, without assuming
that no intervening events would have occurred.33
In addition, courts must "make guesses about the way in which free
will would have been exercised" in the legitimate disposition of the property
had the rightful owner not been dispossessed.3 4 And each succeeding
generation of rightful possessors has its own free will to exercise. If, for
example, each succeeding potential rightful possessor of the property might
have legitimately disposed of it in one of ten ways, then by the third generation
of ownership there are already one thousand possibilities of disposition.
According to Jeremy Waldron, a claimant to such property today must
reasonably contend, in a manner that satisfies some objective standard of
evidence, that out of thousands of possibilities for the legitimate disposition of
the property, it would have come to them.35
Of course, not all possibilities of legitimate disposition are equally
likely, and we should not let the possibility that a rightful possessor might have
made some unpredictable, whimsical choice relieve us of the burden of
reconstructing, based on the best evidence we have, what the possessor most
likely would have done as far as we can tell.36 And, even if we can say little
else with specificity, we should at least be able to say, as Waldron does, that "if
the injustice had not taken place, the descendants of those who suffered it
would be better off than they are and descendants of those who perpetrated it
would be somewhat worse off than they are."3 7
In addition to practical difficulties, the relative moral weight of
restitution claims may diminish over time for several reasons. Waldron has
argued that "some rights are capable of 'fading' in their moral importance by
virtue of the passage of time and by the sheer persistence of what was
originally a wrongful infringement."38 The fact that a person wrongfully
dispossessed once had a morally justifiable claim does not necessarily mean
that she still does: a past unjust act may become a presently just circumstance.39
For example, distributive concerns may undermine the relative moral
weight of restitution claims. In Janna Thompson's words, "Fulfilling reparative

3
Waldron, supra note 3, at 8; Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Property Reparations
(Cornell Law School Research Paper Series, Paper No. 24, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=404940.
34
Waldron, supra note 3, at 10.

35 Id.
36

But cf id at 10.

Id. at 11.
Id at 15 (citing such doctrines as adverse possession, prescription, and statutes of
limitation).
3
Id. at 24. In Waldron's formulation, the relative moral weight of a restitution claim may in
fact be "superseded" when "changing circumstances can have an effect on ownership rights
notwithstanding the moral legitimacy of the original appropriation." Id
3

38
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obligations may clash with a duty to make our society more equitable for all
citizens." 40 The present day needs of a population dependent upon the just
distribution of resources might take precedence. As Waldron says,
If an individual makes a claim to the exclusive use or
possession of some resources in our territory, then the
difficulty of sustaining that claim will clearly have some
relation to the level of our concern about the plight of other
persons who will have to be excluded from the resources if the
claim is recognized. 41
Waldron's concern, understandably, is "to focus upon present and prospective
costs-the suffering and deprivation over which we still have some control."A2
Of course the impulse to focus on suffering and deprivation that we can still
prevent is not necessarily incompatible with restitution. All depends upon the
facts. But according to Waldron, "[iut is the impulse to justice now that should
lead the way in this process, not the reparation of something whose wrongness
is understood primarily in relation to conditions that no longer obtain.A 3
The relative moral strength of restitution claims may also diminish over
the course of time for reasons personally tied to the lives of the former and
current possessors. To the extent that property rights arise through the
importance "of an object to the identity of the possessor," the longer one
44
possesses property, the deeper that tie may become. Sometimes "a person
works with an object, shaping and modifying it, so that it becomes imbued with
part of her personality; it comes to contain a part of herself." 45 On the other
hand, "if the object is taken out of one's hands for a long enough period, the
intimacy of that relation may evaporate." 6
Similarly, moral claims about the role of property in preserving the
owner's autonomy diminish over time. As Waldron argues, "If something was
taken from me decades ago, the claim that it now forms the center of my life
and that it is still indispensable to the exercise of my autonomy is much less
credible."47 Conversely, claims of the wrongful or secondary possessor about
the centrality of the object to her autonomy grow more credible. Succeeding
generations of secondary possessors may generate legitimate expectations with

40

JANNA THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATION
AND HISTORIC

(2002).
Waldron, supra note 3, at 20.
Id. at 26.

INJUSTICE xi

41
42

43

Id. at 27.
at 16.

SId.

45
46

Id.

47

Id at 18-19.
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regard to their ownership of the property. People who are themselves innocent
possessors of property wrongfully acquired by their predecessors-in-interest
"organize their lives and their economic activity" in the belief that the property
is, and will continue to be, theirs.48 That expectation may reasonably invoke our
sympathies, particularly if the wrongfully dispossessed are now dead and
therefore seem beyond harm.
However, while it is undoubtedly true that the interests of the dead are
less pressing than the needs of the living, it is also true that property law has
long recognized and protected the interests of the dead as a means of giving
fulfillment to their lives' work. Property rights are uniquely and particularly
designed to reach forward in time, past the lives of their current possessors, to
affect the lives of others.49 It is impossible to harm one generation through
dispossession but not another, and it is impossible to benefit one generation
through expropriation but not another. Through the facility of the estate, the
dead are entitled to some form of life after death. The dead's call upon us is
particularly strong with regard to the transfer of their lives' work to those they
loved: "[e]ntitlements that result from expressions of love and concern intrinsic
to family relationships or friendships ought to be regarded with considerable
respect .... [I]t is a desire to give meaning to the future-directed activities of a
life."so Thus, it is not enough to answer that the wronged are dead. Physically,
people may be past, but their legal being-their will-is present through the
institution of property. If, by refusing restitution claims, we deny the interests
of the dead in conveying their lives' work to their loved ones, then we are-in a
sense-denying them the limited present-life to which they are still entitled.
Finally, we may believe that the moral obligation to provide restitution
weakens as degrees of separation are added between the dispossessor and the
dispossessed. Thompson, for example, argues that "moral duties" arise between
people "because they are in a special relationship" 5 ' and exist only between
"particular individuals or groups at particular periods of time." 5 2 If, over time,
the relationship between the possessor and the dispossessed becomes too
attenuated-for example, where the parties are merely members of groups,
some of whose members benefitted from dispossession, on the one hand, and
some of whose members suffered from dispossession, on the otherobligations arising from injustice become "historical" rather than present.
Obligations are

Id. at 16.
For example: the idea of the will, at its essence, is that the will of the deceased survives her
death and controls the disposition of her property. See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE
LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 57 (2010).
50
THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 123.
48

49

5
52

Id. at x.
Id
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historical when those who are supposed to be responsible for
keeping the promise, honouring the contract, paying the debt,
or making reparation are not the ones who made the promise or
did the deeds, but their descendants or successors. In many
cases those to whom historical obligations are supposed to be
owed are not the victims themselves, but their descendants or
successors.5 3
By the time restitution claims are based on historical obligations, under
Thompson's definition, their relative moral weight may have diminished
fatally.54 Hanoch Dagan calls the two fundamental and potentially
insurmountable questions that arise when obligations become historical the
"Why you?" and "Why me?" questions: Why are you entitled to restitution?
And why should I have to provide it? 55
The intersection of the two dynamics analyzed so far-the changing
social construction of property rights-worthiness, and the corrosive effects of
time on the viability of restitution claims-creates a powerful paradox that
seriously compromises the potential of restitution as a remedy for mass
dispossessions. The two dynamics occur simultaneously: as the construction of
rights-unworthiness is changing so that those once considered unworthy of
property rights are becoming worthy of them, the viability of restitution claims
is corroding. Restitution cannot occur until enough time passes that socially
constructed views of unworthiness change, but the passage of time makes
restitution claims untenable. This is the time-unworthiness paradox: only the
passage of time makes restitution possible, but the passage of time makes
restitution impossible.
That is the bitter legacy, for example, of Native American claims to
land from which they were (now admittedly) unjustly dispossessed. In a series
of cases starting in the 1920s and culminating recently, United States federal
courts recognized that several Native American tribes had been unlawfully
dispossessed of their lands, but held that too much time had passed for their
claims to be viable. In Sherrill, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the
difference between the existence of a right to land and the means to "vindicate
that right."5 6 The Court held that because there had been "development of every

s3

Id. at 10.

The argument is compelling, but it is worth recalling that through the doctrine of covenants
and servitudes, we create and enforce obligations that attach to land; their entire purpose is to
"run with the land" rather than with the lives of people. These obligations are not tied to any
being, whether living or legal. People may be past, but the land is not; and if their obligations are
bound into the land itself, then their obligations are not past either.
s5
Hanoch Dagan, Restitution's Realism 17 (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Faculty, Working Paper No.
67, 2008).
56
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 210 (2005) (quoting Oneida Indian
Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61, 90 (N.D.N.Y 2000)).
54
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type imaginable" in the 200 intervening years since the tribes were unlawfully
deprived of their land, restoration was "impracticab[le]." In other words, by
the time Native Americans were considered worthy of property rights-respect,
it was too late to restore their property rights to them. That is the effect of the
time-unworthiness paradox.
However, even if we acknowledge that someone was wronged, that
does not necessarily imply that we are the ones who must put things right. No
form of restitution will be provided unless the current possessors of property
conclude that they have some responsibility to provide it. This problem
inevitably leads to a second apparent paradox that undermines restitution
claims: the concept of collective responsibility.
The Collective Responsibility Paradox

D.

"Collective responsibility," as the term is typically used, refers to moral
blameworthiness located in a group for actions taken by some group members.
As Marion Smiley puts it, "[I]t is the moral blameworthiness of the collective
itself, rather than that of its members, that constitutes collective moral
responsibility."58 Responsibility for wrongs committed by some members of
the group attaches to all members without regard for their individual moral
blameworthiness. Most moral philosophers and legal systems reject the
concept of collective responsibility as inherently unjust.60
Mass dispossessions often result from the unjust imposition of
collective responsibility. But mass restitution would require a type of collective
responsibility imposed on current possessors, resulting in their dispossession,
regardless of whether they as individuals committed any wrongful act. In other
words, undoing the injustice of the imposition of collective responsibility
would require the imposition of collective responsibility. This is the collective
responsibility paradox.
The time-unworthiness paradox compounds the problem. That is
because the people who cause a mass dispossession don't consider it unjust,
and thus don't consider themselves morally bound to undo it. Over time, the

See id. at 210-11, 219.
Marion Smiley, Collective Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collectiveresponsibility/.
57

58

59

Id

As Margaret Gilbert says, "What does the blameworthiness of the collective's act imply
about the personal blameworthiness of any one member of that collective? From a logical point
of view, the short answer is: nothing. Everything depends upon the details of a given member's
particular situation." Margaret Gilbert, Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its
Implications for Group Members, 30 MIDWEST STUD. INPHIL. 94, 109 (2006). H. D. Lewis
argues that the entire concept of collective responsibility is not only unjust, but "barbarous."
Smiley, supra note 58 (citing H.D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, 23 PHIL. 3, 3-6 (1948)).
60
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social construction of unworthiness changes, so that the following
generations-the secondary possessors-consider the dispossession unjust. But
because they didn't cause the dispossession, they reject the imposition of
collective responsibility and thus do not consider themselves morally bound to
restore property rights to the dispossessed.
That is particularly true where a new political order emerges, and new
legal institutions are put into place. Those changes can, in the minds of
secondary possessors, break the link with past wrongs that would require the
assumption of collective responsibility to right them. If that dynamic prevails,
then the wronged will remain wronged, and injustice will become a permanent
facet of that society.
The first step in overcoming the collective responsibility paradox is to
distinguish between two very different acts: the imposition of rightsunworthiness and the assumption of collective responsibility to make amends.
This is not a matter of semantics; it is simply more accurate and useful to say
that mass dispossessions result not from the imposition of collective
responsibility, but from the imposition of collective rights-unworthiness. We
should reclaim the term "collective responsibility" to mean the voluntary
assumption of responsibility by a society to undo harm.
Understood in this way, collective rights-unworthiness is imposed upon
others unjustly, resulting in their dispossession; collective responsibility, by
contrast, is just if it is voluntarily accepted by a society, resulting in the
restitution of others. A society can assume collective responsibility to
overcome the unjust effects of the imposition of collective rights-unworthiness.
By carefully distinguishing between those acts, we overcome the apparent-but
only apparent-paradox of "collective responsibility" with regard to restitution
claims.
As Margaret Gilbert explains, there is a subtle but critical distinction
between what she describes as "backward-looking" and "forward-looking"
claims of responsibility.6 1 A backward-looking claim might be characterized as
"we are responsible for what happened." 6 2 That is a claim that secondary
possessors often naturally reject. But a forward-looking claim, by contrast,
might be characterized as "[t]hough we are not morally responsible for what
happened, we are morally responsible for ameliorating its effects."63
Dispossession may be a past injustice of which the present possessor is
innocent, but continuing to enjoy the fruits of that injustice is a present harm
for which the present possessor is partly responsible. Conceived in this way,
responsibility is not imposed on innocent heirs by the past; it is imposed by
present possessors on themselves.

61

Gilbert, supra note 60, at 94.

62

Id

63

Id.
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II. THE PARADOXES OF RESTITUTION IN ACTION
The paradoxes of restitution can be observed in action. In the twentieth
century, what is now the Czech Republic endured several rapid and disruptive
changes in political regimes. The result was repeated, massive dispossessions
of property rights. Since 1992, the Czech Republic has been engaged in an
intensive and controversial program of restitution with regard to some who
were dispossessed-but not others. To bring this story into relief, we can
examine the stories of three Czech restitution claimants. The ordinary and
extraordinary tales of these claimants reveal a great deal about who receives
restitution and who does not, in the Czech Republic and far beyond.
The Czech Republic's Traumatic Century

A.

In the early twentieth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire controlled
central Europe." Within that empire were the lands that would eventually
comprise the Czech Republic. Following the dissolution of the AustroHungarian Empire in the aftermath of World War One, Czech and Slovak
nationalists successfully persuaded the victorious allied powers to recognize
Czechoslovakia, a new country comprised in the majority of their two national
identities.6 5 Czechoslovakia was a multi-ethnic country, populated primarily by
people who identified ethnically as Czechs in regions known as Bohemia and
Moravia, as Slovaks in Slovakia, and as Germans in the lands bordering
Germany and Austria, commonly referred to as the Sudetenland. 6 Prague, the
capital city, had an ethnically diverse population of Czechs, Germans, and a
significant Jewish community.
The years between 1918 and the mid-1930s were marked by tension
within Czechoslovakia between the ethnic Czechs and ethnic Germans. With
the rise of German nationalism that both propelled and resulted from the rise of
Nazism in Germany, those tensions increased. 69 The Nazis' avowed goal of
expanding the German state to encompass all lands occupied by ethnic
Germans in Europe posed a direct threat to Czechoslovak sovereignty,
particularly in the Sudetenland, where ethnic Germans were in the majority.70
At the infamous Munich Conference in 1938, France and Britain told
Germany's Nazi government that they would not go to war to prevent the

66

A HISTORY OF THE CZECH LANDS (Jaroslav Pinek & Oldfich Tuna, eds., 2009).
Id at 397-400.
Id

67

Id

6
65

68

ZDENEK BENE9 ET AL., FACING HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CZECH-GERMAN RELATIONS IN
THE CZECH PROVINCES, 1848-1948, at 88 (Zdenak Bene & Viclav Kural, eds., 2002).
69
A HISTORY OF THE CZECH LANDS, supra note 64, at 419-20.
70

Id. at 424.
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German occupation of the Sudetenland, despite France's treaty obligations to
Czechoslovakia. In return, Germany promised that it would take only the
Sudetenland and no more of Europe. 7 1 The German military crossed the
Czechoslovak border unopposed on October 1, 1938, and occupied the
Sudetenland border region. It was welcomed by many ethnic Germans in the

region.72
Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneg went into exile.73 On March 15,
1939, Hitler summoned Beneg's successor, President Emil Hdcha, to Berlin and
presented him with an ultimatum: allow German forces to occupy the entire
Czech lands unopposed or Prague would be bombed that day.74 Hdcha ordered
the Czech military to stand down, and on the morning of March 16, 1939, the
entire Czech Republic was occupied.
Nazi Germany granted independence to Slovakia and reconstituted the
Czech lands as a "protectorate" of the German state: the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia. 7 6 Non-Jewish ethnic Germans who had been
Czechoslovak citizens were made citizens of the Reich instead. Ethnic Czechs
were disenfranchised, and some were made forced laborers.78 Ultimately,
according to Hitler's original plan, about half of the ethnic Czechs were to be
"Germanized"; the remainder was to be expelled to the east. However, that plan
was never implemented, presumably due to the fortunes of war.79 Within the
Protectorate, many ethnic Germans assumed positions of power.80
The Nazis sent tens of thousands of Czechoslovak citizens who were
Jews, Roma, homosexuals, communists, and perceived opponents of the Nazis
(including both ethnic Czechs and ethnic Germans) to labor and concentration
camps at Terezin, Lety, and Buchenwald-and many ultimately to death at
Auschwitz and Birkenau. I Their property was expropriated.82 The Nazis also

71
72

Id. at 429, 435.
Id. at 435-38.

74

Id. at 440.
Id. at 442.

75

Id.

76

Id

7

BENE9, supra note 68, at 122.
See BENJAMIN FROMMER, NATIONAL

7

78

CLEANSING:

A

RETRIBUTION

AGAINST

NAZI

COLLABORATORS INPOSTWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA 17 (2005).

See BENE9 ET AL., supra note 68, at 179.
so
Istvdn Poginy, InternationalHuman Rights Law, ReparatoryJustice and the Re-ordering
ofMemory in Central andEastern Europe, 10 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 397, 419 (2010).
79

81
82

BENE9 ET AL., supra note 68, at 188.
FROMMER, supra note 78, at 16-17.
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murdered many people, including hundreds of children, as a deterrent against,
and in retribution for, opposition and resistance activities. 83
In April and May, 1945, after seven years of occupation, German
forces were driven from Czechoslovakia, primarily by the Soviet army.84
President Beneg's government-in-exile returned.85 In the post-War chaos,
Beneg ruled by a series of Decrees that are now known collectively as the
"Beneg Decrees."8 6 In relevant part, the Beneg Decrees: (a) expropriated the
property of all ethnic German Czechoslovaks;87 (b) stripped all ethnic German
Czechoslovaks of their citizenship88 unless they could prove that they had
either actively supported the Republic and resisted the occupation, or had been
persecuted by the occupation government; 89 (c) rendered void property
transactions that occurred "under the pressure of the [o]ccupation or of

83
Most infamously, in revenge for the assassination of SS Reichsprotektor Reinhard
Heydrich (convener of the infamous Wannssee Conference on the "final solution" for European
Jews, and the highest ranking Nazi official assassinated anywhere during the war) by the Czech
resistance, the entire village of Lidice was destroyed. Every male aged 15 and over was shot.
Every woman was sent to a concentration camp, where half died. Eighty-eight of the 105
children were murdered; 17 were considered Aryan enough to merit adoption by German
families and shipped off to Germany. Many of those children were not found until years after the
war, some with no memory of their former lives and families. Every building in the village was
burned, every grave disinterred, every tree cut down, and the ground was covered with soil.
Today the site of the former village is a memorial. BENER ET AL., supra note 68, at 176-77;
FROMMER, supra note 78, at 19; see also Branik Ceslav & Carmelo Lisciotto, The Massacre At
Lidice, HEART (2008), http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/nazioccupation/lidice.html.
84
See FROMMER, supra note 78.
85
The United States Third Army drove the German army from and occupied parts of the
eastern Czech lands, but the Soviets liberated and occupied a much larger portion of the Czech
lands, including Prague. See id
86
Id. at 3 1.
8
D. 12/1945, June 21, 1945, Concerning the Confiscation and Expeditious Redistribution of
the Agricultural Property of Germans, Hungarians, and Also Traitors and Enemies of the Czech
and Slovak Nations, SBiRKA ZAKONO (SB.), art. 1, para. 1(a) (CZECH) (decree of then President of
the Czech Republic, Edvard Beneg).
88
D. 33/1945, Aug. 2, 1945, Concerning the Regulation of Czechoslovak State Citizenship of
Person of German and Hungarian Nationality, SaiRKA ZAKONO (SB.), art. 1, para. 2 (CZECH)
(decree of then President of the Czech Republic, Edvard Bene§).
89
Id at art. 2, para. 1. As early as 1943, while still in exile, Bene§ had proposed to the
Soviets a ten-point plan that included stripping ethnic Germans of their Czech citizenship
following liberation. See BENES, supra note 68, at 185-86.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

636

[Vol. 116

national, racial or political persecution"; 90 and (d) expropriated the property of
all business that collaborated with occupation forces. 91
Ethnic German Czechoslovaks faced violent reprisals and forced
relocations. 92 These occurred in two phases. The "wild transfer," as it is now
known, occurred immediately after the war. Carried out by hastily formed
groups of militias and vigilantes, and sometimes also organized by the
Czechoslovak army or police, the "wild transfer" often took the form of simple
mass murder.93 There are no exact figures available, but most historians agree
that at least 25,000 ethnic Germans were killed.94 Many were simply
massacred. 9 5 Many died on forced marches or in camps. 9 6 Those who did not
die were forcibly expelled into Germany.97
The most horrific irony was undoubtedly reserved for ethnically
German Jews returning to Czechoslovakia from the Nazi concentration and
death camps. As ethnic Germans, they too were rounded up, killed, or placed
into camps. 9 8 Thousands were forcibly expelled-into Germany, the country
that had recently been totally committed to exterminating them. 99 It was not
until September of 1946, sixteen months after the end of the war, that the
Czechoslovak government ordered a halt to the forcible expulsion of ethnic
German Jews. 00
Following the "wild transfer," expulsions became more systematic, but
no systematic effort was ever made to distinguish between ethnic Germans who
supported the occupation and those who did not. By 1948, approximately three

D. 5/1945, May 19, 1945, Invalidity of Certain Property Transactions at the Time of Loss
of Freedom and on the National Administration of the Property Assets of Germans, Hungarians,
Traitors and Other Collaborators and Certain Organisations and Institutions, art. 1, para. I
(CZECH) (decree of then President of the Czech Republic, Edvard Beneg).
91 See D. 108/1945, Oct. 25, 1945, Concerning Confiscation of Enemy Property and Funds of
National Renewal, Part I, art. 1, para. 1-2 (CZECH) (decree of then President of the Czech
Republic, Edvard Beneg).
90

92

FROMMER, supra note 78.

9
There were, according to Czech historians, "numerous acts of violence, murders, mob
justice, lynchings, and several mass murders of the German population intentionally organised by
the army." BENE9 ET AL., supra note 68, at 221.
94

Id. at 182-83.

9
From May through July of 1945, in Postoloprty, 763 ethnic German Czechoslovaks were
murdered; in Horni Moltdnice, 265 (including 74 children); in Usti nad Labem, between 80-100,
many of whom were thrown from the town bridge into the Elbe River, where they drowned. See
id at 222.
96

Id. at 229.

9
9

See FROMMER, supra note 78, at 31.
See BENE9 ET AL., supra note 68, at 229.

99

See id

100

Id. at 228.
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million ethnic German Czechoslovaks had lost all property rights and had
been-to use a modem term-"ethnically cleansed" from Czechoslovakia.101
On February 25, 1948, the Czechoslovak communist party, having
gained a substantial representation in the Czechoslovak parliament
democratically, seized control of the government. The Czechoslovak
communist government began a massive program of nationalization and
collectivization, dispossessing the bourgeois and petit bourgeois of private
property rights.10 2 "[E]xpropriation and nationalization of private property was
one of the most important features of installing the communist system in the
Czech Republic," and "almost the entire economy was brought into state or
quasi-state ownership forms." 10 3 By the end of communist rule in
Czechoslovakia in 1989, property in private hands produced less than 5% of its
gross domestic product. 10 4
The Czechoslovak communist government was totalitarian and
authoritarian, brutally repressing all forms of dissent and democratic expression
through clandestine surveillance, harassment, imprisonment, and physical
violence. 05 Dissidents were harassed, arrested, interrogated, imprisoned,
exiled, and in some cases executed.106 People from middle-class backgrounds
and dissidents were forced into low-skill labor jobs and their children were
denied secondary and higher education.10 7
The communist government ruled for 41 years. In November 1989, it
was driven from power in the wake of the popular uprising known as the Velvet
Revolution. Dissidents led by long-imprisoned human rights advocate Vaclav
Havel came to power.
Many Czechs bristle at that term, but if ethnic cleansing has any meaning, then it must
include the forced expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people based solely on their ethnicity as
part of a policy of removing all people of that ethnicity from a country. Even if we assume that as
many as three-quarters of the 3,000,000 ethnic German population of pre-war Czechoslovakia
supported the occupation, and even if we pretend that denying those 2,250,000 people a trial
before expropriating their property, stripping their citizenship, and forcibly expelling them from
the country was justifiable under the circumstances, that leaves another 750,000 people who were
expelled from the country and lost their property rights without legal process, not based on their
behavior, but based solely on their ethnic identity. By any reasonable definition, that is ethnic
cleansing. For further discussion on the definition of ethnic cleansing, see Andrew Bell-Fialkoff,
A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 110, available at
http://hmb.utoronto.ca/hmb303h/weeklysupp/week-04-05/bellfialkoff ethnic cleansing.pdf
102
A HISTORY OF THE CZECH LANDS, supra note 64, at 505-06.
10

103

4 JAN URBAN, PRIVATIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN CZECH REPUBLIC: STUDY IN

INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 14 (2005).
'4
105

Id. at 18.

106

id.
Id.

See VAclav Havel, Power of the Powerless, in THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS: CITIZENS
AGAINST THE STATE IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 10 (John Keane ed., 1985); see also A
HISTORY OF THE CZECH LANDS, supra note 64, at 502, 508.
107
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The Paradoxes ofRestitution in the Czech Republic

B.

Havel was determined to confront the past truthfully.10 As part of its
attempt to emerge from the nightmare of its post-Nazi and post-totalitarian
communist history, Czechoslovakia began to craft a restitution program for the
return of property to the dispossessed.'0 o In 1990 and 1991, Czechoslovakia
enacted "radical" and sweeping restitution programs that went far beyond the
programs enacted by many other Eastern Bloc countries to return private
property expropriated by the communist regime.'10
The first of these statutes was entitled the "Law on Relieving the
Consequences of Some Property Injustices" and is now commonly known as
the Small Restitution Law.' It took effect in October 1990 and allowed
restitution of a limited set of small businesses. 1 12 The second and more
comprehensive statute was entitled the "Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation"
and informally as the Second Restitution Law. 1 13 The Second Restitution Law

los
In the opening words of his first address to the nation as President, on New Year's Day
1990, Havel set the tone for his administration's commitment to truth:
For forty years you heard from my predecessors on this day variations on the
same theme: how our country was flourishing, how many million tons of
steel we produced, how happy we all were, how we trusted our government,
and what bright prospects were unfolding in front of us. I assume you did not
propose me for this office so that I, too, would lie to you.
Viclav Havel, President, Czech Republic, New Year's Address to the Nation, 1990 (Jan. 1,
1990), availableat http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/1 11.
109 David Roman & Susanne Y. P. Choi, Forgiveness and TransitionalJustice in the Czech
Republic, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 339, 347 (2006). In addition to the return of property
confiscated by the fascist and communist regimes, political prisoners were released and
compensated, political convictions were abrogated, students expelled for political reasons were
re-admitted, workers fired for political reasons were re-employed, and compensation was paid to
the heirs of political prisoners who were executed or died in prison. Id Under the communist
regime, between 250,000 and 300,000 people were convicted of political crimes. Id at 346 n.15.
Around 235 of these people were executed, and between 4,000 and 6,000 political prisoners died
in custody "under unclear circumstances." Id. at 346 n. 14.
110
Poginy, supra note 80, at 412. These laws were called the "1991 Law on Extrajudicial
Rehabilitation" and the "Law on the Revision of Ownership Relations to Land and Other
Agricultural Property." Id; Andrzej K. Kotmi6ski, Restitution of Private Property: RePrivatization in Central and EasternEurope, 30 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 95, 99
(1997) (calling the Czech restitution scheme "the most radical" and "broadest in scope" in
Central and Eastern Europe).
I'
Jifi Pehe, Legal Difficulties Beset the Czech Restitution Process, in 3 RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY RESEARCH REPORT No. 28, at 6 (1994); George E. Glos, Restitution of
Confiscated Property in the Czech Republic, CZECHOSLOVAK Soc'Y OF ARTS AND SCi.,
http://www.svu2000.org/issues/glos.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
112
Pehe, supra note 111.

113

Id.
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applied to all types of property other than agricultural land.' 14 A third statute,
the Law on the Revision of Ownership Relations to Land and Other
Agricultural Property ("The Land Law"), applied to agricultural land and
operated under the same general criteria as the Second Restitution Law." 5
Extraordinarily, the preferred remedy under these laws was specific
restoration of the actual property taken, unless the property (1) had been
significantly improved upon and (2) was in the hands of private possessors who
were themselves innocent of any wrongdoing with. regard to the seizure of the
property.1 6 If the property was in the hands of the government, then former
owners were entitled to have the property itself back even if it had been
significantly improved upon, provided they paid the value of the improvements
to the government. The Czechoslovak government committed itself to
compensating former owners who could not qualify for specific restoration.
Moreover, the government committed itself to compensating innocent current
possessors in cases where specific restoration could occur." 7 The restitution
laws reached descendants beyond those recognized in Czechoslovak intestacy
laws, allowing claims by even grandnieces and grandnephews of the
dispossessed."' In essence, Czechoslovakia had made an amazing
commitment: it would compensate both innocent current possessors whose land
was restored to its previous owners and previous owners (or their descendants)
who could not qualify for restoration.
For a country newly emerging from decades of economic stagnation
and regression, this commitment was both radical and perilous. Restitution was
not, after all, necessary to the transition from a socialist economy to a capitalist
one. "[P]rivatization was seen as a key method to achieve transition to a market
economy," but privatization does not require restitution, and, in fact, the two
can be at odds." 9 The purpose of privatization is to transfer property into
private hands, from which it will presumably be deployed rationally in the
interest of profit, and therefore efficiently.120 The purpose of restitution, by
contrast, is returning property into the hands of its previous possessors or their
heirs, regardless of whether it can be presumed it will subsequently be
deployed rationally and efficiently. Privatization quickly resolves uncertainties
about property rights, allowing private transactions and investment to proceed.
The restitution process, which often involves competing claims and requires
judicial or administrative decision-making, can prolong and even create

114

id

"'

Id.

116

See id. at 6-7.

"

See id. at 7.

118

4 URBAN, supra note 103, at 26.

"9

Id. at 14.

120

Id. at 22.
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uncertainties, delaying or preventing private transactions and investment,
121
particularly in a country without an experienced independent judiciary.
Privatization results in capital flow to the state, from private hands, through the
auction and direct sale process. The Czech restitution process, by contrast,
resulted in the flow of both physical property and capital from the state, into
private hands. Compared to other transitional Central and Eastern European
countries emerging from communist rule, the Czech commitment to restitution

was much greater. 12 2
Czechs and Slovaks favored restitution over privatization because it
"was argued to foster historical justice by returning unjustly expropriated
property."1 23 Although aware of the economic burden that the country was
assuming through its restitution program, Vdclav Havel stated that for the
people of Czechoslovakia, restitution was a moral issue rather than an
economic one: "There was a deep longing for property restitution . . .. [T]here

were tens if not hundreds of thousands of tradesmen and small businessmen for
whom the communist program of nationalization had been a catastrophe. The
trauma they had experienced after 1948 was clearly passed from generation to
,,124
generation ... .
The restitution laws manifested "the general will to right
those earlier economic wrongs."1 2 5 Then-Finance Minister, now President
VAclav Klaus-in exceedingly rare agreement with Havel-said, "[I]f there is a
restitution, the price tag is not important. It is a moral question."l 26
In total, almost four million of the ten million people in the Czech
Republic were directly affected by the restitution program. More than 10% of
the value of all government-owned assets was directly restored to individual
claimants. 12 7 The estimated total value of property restored and compensation
paid under these laws was 10.7 billion dollars, an astonishing 42% of the Czech
Republic's gross domestic product in 1991.128
But although the 1990-91 laws were notable for the depth of their
commitment to restitution, they were also notable for what they did not do.
First, they applied only to property expropriations that occurred after February

Id at 28.
Id. at 26-27. Hungary provided only compensation rather than restoration, and not until
1995. Poland has still not enacted a comprehensive restitution program.
123
Id. at 26.
124
VACLAV HAVEL, To THE CASTLE AND BACK 269 (Vintage Canada 2006) [hereinafter To
121
122

THE CASTLE AND BACK].
125

Id

Anna Gelpern, The Law and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A
Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 315, 359 (1993) (quoting Peter S. Green, Czechoslovak
Restitution Could Cost $11 Billion, UPI, Feb. 21, 1991).
126

127

4 URBAN, supra note 103.

128

id.
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25, 1948, the day the communists seized power.12 9 Moreover, claimants had to
have both Czech citizenship and permanent residence in the country.130 By
excluding those who had lost their property before 1948, those who were no
longer resident in Czechoslovakia, and those who were not citizens, the 199091 laws deliberately and obviously excluded ethnic Germans who had been
stripped of their property rights and citizenship and expelled between 1945 and
1948.
In 1991, the laws were amended to allow restitution for victims of
racially motivated confiscations under the Nazis if they had not previously
received restitution. In 1992, the restitution program was expanded again, with
a new law for the first time providing for restitution of some property seized
from ethnic Germans between 1945 and 1948.131 In order to make a successful
claim under the 1992 law, claimants were required to demonstrate that (1) they
were permanent residents of Czechoslovakia; (2) they were Czechoslovak
citizens at the time they were dispossessed, and at the time of their claim for
restitution; and (3) they had retained Czechoslovak citizenship immediately
after the occupation by proving active loyalty during it.13 2
The number of claimants who could satisfy these criteria was
exceedingly small. During the ethnic cleansing of 1945-48, very few had been
given the opportunity to retain their citizenship by proving active loyalty during
the occupation. Even among those few who did, some were no longer residents
in or citizens of the country. Calls by ethnic Germans to expand the criteria for
restitution were denounced or ignored.
But as important as the corrosive effects of time are for explaining why
restitution is impossible under some circumstances, those effects cannot
account fully for the refusal of Czechs to restitute ethnic Germans dispossessed
between 1945 and 1948. That must be true, because the Czechs have enacted
restitution schemes for people dispossessed by the Nazi government between
1939 and 1945 and by the communist regime between 1948 and 1989. Because
the Czechs have voluntarily assumed the burdens of restitution for
dispossessions that occurred both before and after 1945-1948, time alone
cannot explain the failure of Czechs to provide restitution for ethnic Germans.
Just as those once considered unworthy of property rights-respect can
"become" worthy of them, people once considered worthy can become
unworthy. Nazi ideology depended upon a re-casting of some beings as

129
130

Poginy, supra note 80, at 412.
Pehe, supra note Il l, at 6-13. Claims were also limited to natural persons. Therefore,
entities such as churches could not seek restitution under the 1990-91 laws. After two decades of
negotiations, the government reached an agreement for the return of most church property in
2011.
131 See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 747/1997, Des Four Walderode
v. Czech
Republic, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/747 (1997), [hereinafter Des Four Walderode].
132

Id. at para. 2.3.
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Untermenschen (sub-humans) who unjustly were occupying Lebensraum
(living space) needed by those who were fully human.'3 3 Sub-humans,
according to Nazi ideology, included Jews, Roma, and Slays.13 4 Those subhumans occupied vast swaths of Central and Eastern Europe.13 5 That badly
needed living space should be occupied by sub-humans seemed a gross
injustice to Nazi ideologues, and taking it from them seemed a restoration of
"natural" order. 36
But in bitter irony, outrages perpetrated by Nazi occupiers and
collaborators may have triggered in many Czechs a new socially constructed
belief about the rights-unworthiness of ethnically German Czechoslovaksregardless of whether they participated in any wrongful acts. It is important to
note the distinction between criminal guilt and rights-unworthiness. Criminal
guilt calls for punishment, but punishment was not the motivating force behind
the ethnic German dispossessions. Those ethnic Germans whom the Czechs
believed were guilty of actual crimes, and therefore should be punished, were
indeed punished-through lynchings, executions, or prison. But dispossession
resulted regardless of criminal guilt. After all, even ethnic Germans who had
proven they were not guilty of disloyalty were stripped of the right to possess
property. If innocence did not restore property rights, then criminal culpability
did not take property rights away. Rather, ethnic Germans were considered
unworthy of property rights on the basis of their ethnicity alone.
Throughout the 1990s, Czech resistance to restitution claims by ethnic
Germans remained adamant. Sometimes, that resistance stretched the
boundaries of the rule of law or broke through them entirely. The Ministry of
the Interior established a special secret police unit code-named "Property" to
monitor and disrupt restitution claims by ethnic Germans. The "Property" unit
wiretapped phone calls and monitored e-mail conversations between restitution
claimants and their attorneys, a practice later declared illegal by the
Constitutional Court.' 37 Many restitution claimants are firmly convinced they
were subjected to much more clandestine surveillance and interference than has
yet been acknowledged. 38
In 1997, Germany and the Czech Republic issued a joint declaration by
which they pledged, essentially, to agree to disagree about restitution for
expellees, but not to let that disagreement stand in the way of their

1"

See WOODRUFF D. SMITH, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF NAZI IMPERIALISM

(Oxford Univ.

Press 1986).
134
'3
136

Id
Id.
Id

137

See Jan Richter, Constitutional Court Rules Restitution Lawyer's Wiretapping Illegal,
(Oct. 18, 2007, 3:26 PM), http://www.radio.czlen/section/curraffrs/constitutionalcourt-rules-restitution-lawyers-wiretapping-illegal.
13
See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3.
RADIO PRAHA,
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relationship.13 9 The Czech government expressed regret over the expulsions,
stating:
[T]he Czech side regrets that, by the forcible expulsion and
forced resettlement of Sudeten Germans from the former
Czechoslovakia after the war as well as by the expropriation
and deprivation of citizenship, much suffering and injustice
was inflicted upon innocent people, also in view of the fact that
guilt was attributed collectively. 40
Despite that regret, further restitution reforms were not forthcoming.
The Czech restitution program has clearly demonstrated two things.
First, the Czechs are committed to restitution even at enormous cost, if they
consider the dispossessions at issue unjust. Second, in the post-war years, the
Czechs did not consider the post-war dispossessions of ethnic Germansregardless of their individual guilt or innocence-unjust. The Czechs no longer
considered ethnic Germans worthy of rights-respect. They saw them as outside
the bounds of community to whom such respect was due.
In 2002, the Czech government produced a textbook entitled Facing
History to be used in Czech schools to explain the expulsions.141 It is a
remarkable, if inadvertent, testament to the struggle over the meaning of the
Czech Republic's post-war history. It is co-authored, but each chapter appears
to have been written by a different author, and the author of each chapter is not
identified. Some chapters are starkly and soberly honest and do exactly what
the title of the document promises. 14 2 Others employ a twisted logic that would
have made the worst communist-era apparatchik proud. 14 3 As a result, Facing
History does not so much sum up Czech history with regard to ethnic Germans
as capture the struggle over that history. It is a little like an archaeological

139

GERMAN-CZECH DECLARATION ON MUTUAL RELATIONS AND THEIR FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT

(Jan. 21, 1997), availableat http://eudocs.lib.byu.edulindex.php/Czech-GermanDeclaration.
140

Id at § Il.

141 BENES ET AL., supra note 68. The title page of FacingHistory contains this note about its

origin: "The text of Facing History is based on information material [sic] produced for teachers
under the title Odsun-Vertreibung. TransferNimcfi z eeskoslovenska 1947 (Odsun-Vertreibung.
The Transfer of the Germans from Czechoslovakia 1947) published for the Ministry of
Education, Youth and Physical Training of the Czech Republic by the SPL - Price and Albra
publishing houses." Id.
142
I interviewed one of the authors of FacingHistory, Professor Jan Kuklik, Jr., as part of my
research for this Article. I did not ask him to identify which parts he authored, but Professor
Kuklik has shown an admirable commitment to facing uncomfortable historical truths.
143
For example, one author defends the decree stripping ethnic Germans of their citizenship
by arguing it "freed them from their duty to the State." BENE ET AL., supra note 68, at 239.
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tablet that captures the transition between one language and another.'" It is a
remarkable artifact of the transition between what I have described in the
introduction as the first two acts of the restitution drama. But if the document is
a testament to transition, it can only be so because things are changing.
These changes are evident in longitudinal survey data. In 2002 and
2007, the Center for Public Opinion Research at the Institute of Sociology at
Charles University in Prague surveyed over 1,000 Czechs aged 15 and older
about their views on the post-war expulsions and expropriations.145 In response
to a question asking whether the post-war expulsions and expropriations were
"just" or "unjust," the responses in 2002 and 2007 show interesting changes:

Just
Unjust
Don't know

2002
60%
26%
14%

2007
48%
28%
24%

In response to a question asking whether the Beneg Decrees should be
repealed,14 6 the responses were:

No
Yes
Don't Know

2002
67%
5%
28%

2007
52%
11%
37%

Obviously, while there is still significant resistance to the idea that the
expulsions and expropriations were unjust, and that the Bene§ Decrees should
be repealed, there is also notable movement as well. By 2007, significantly
more Czechs seemed to be questioning the justice of the expulsions and
dispossessions, even if they were not ready to decide yet that they were unjust.
In fact, by 2007, less than half of those surveyed were willing to say that the

14
It would be interesting to know what Czech schoolchildren who read it make of it. If they
aren't perplexed, it can only be because they already sense the struggle in the society over the
post-war history.
145
Vefejnost o odsunu a Benegov~ch dekretech [PUBLIC ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND THE
BENE DECREES], Centrum pro vyzkum vetejn6ho mindni Sociologicky istav AV CR, v.v.i.
[hereinafter PUBLIC ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND THE BENES DECREES].
146
Id. The question of whether the Bene§ Decrees should be repealed may have been
complicated in the public mind by the Dreithalerdecision, in which the Constitutional Court held
that the Decrees were now inoperative and thus without current effect. See Timothy William
Waters, Remembering Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing, 47 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 63, 116-17 (2006) ("[Tlhe universally accepted Czech view is that those acts were
discrete in time, and since there will be no additional acts relying on the Decrees, they lie
dormant."). In light of that ruling, some Czechs may have concluded that repealing the Benei
Decrees was unnecessary, even if they found them unjust.
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expulsions and expropriations were just.147 Similarly, from 2002 to 2007, the
respondents who believed the Beneg Decrees should not be repealed dropped
by 15%; about half of that percentage thought they should be repealed, and the
other half didn't know. Interestingly, the 2007 survey also reveals significant
differences of opinion among different age demographics.1 48 In response to the
question whether the expulsions and expropriations were just or unjust, age
data revealed the following:

Just
Unjust
Don't Know

Age 30 or younger
33%
17%
50%

Age 60 or older
60%
32%
8%

These data suggest that younger Czechs, compared to the older
generation, are much less committed to the idea that the expulsions and
expropriations were just. Hard data are not available after 2007, but there is
much anecdotal evidence that the significant change underway between 2002
and 2007 has continued and increased in the years since.
It is possible that younger Czechs were simply ignorant of the issue.
But there is good reason to doubt it. In recent years, media coverage of the
once-taboo expulsions has increased enormously.149 For the first time, Czech
television showed documentary footage of the murders during the
expulsions.15 0 National news sources have reported about death marches during
the expulsions and interviewed survivors.' 5 ' Prominent coverage was given to
the uncovering of mass graves of murdered ethnic Germans.152 The nation was
riveted when a criminal investigation was launched into the murders of five

"47

PUBLIC ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND THE BENE DECREES, supra note 145.

148

id.

See Sarah Borufka, Police Uncover Human Bones at Alleged Site ofSudeten German Mass
Murder,
RADIO
PRAHA
(Aug.
17,
2010,
1:30
PM),
http://www.radio.czlen/section/curraffrs/police-uncover-human-bones-at-alleged-site-of-sudetengerman-mass-murder ("For a long time, the expulsion of Sudeten Germans was a taboo subject in
the Czech Republic, but that is now slowly changing.").
1so See Jan Richter, Documentary to Show Post-War Mass Murder of German Civilians in
Prague, RADIO PRAHA (May 6, 2010), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/documentary-toshow-post-war-mass-murder-of-german-civilians-in-prague.
151 See Jan Richter, Marie Ranzenhoferov - A Survivor of the 1945 Brno
Death March,
RADIO PRAHA (May 12, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/czechstoday/marieranzenhoferova-a-survivor-of-the-1945-bmo-death-march.
152 See Bira Prochizkovd, Graves Ought to Have Crosses and Names, RESPEKT.CZ
(April 29,
2011), http://respekt.ihned.cz/respekt-in-english/c 1-51724590-graves-ought-to-have-crosses-and149

names.
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ethnic German children and the murderers were named.'5 3 An unflinching
novel about the expulsions (Penize od Hitlera, or Money from Hitler) won the
country's most prestigious literary prize. A play based upon the novel entered
the repertoire of the small but influential Svandovo Theatre-in a country in
which the power of literature and theater is difficult to overestimate.154 Plans
are underway to open the first museum about the ethnic Germans and their fate,
and the proposed museum has received national media attention.'5 5 American
historian Benjamin Frommer's account of the executions of ethnic German
prisoners after convictions before rudimentary citizen tribunals was translated
into Czech and published in the Czech Republic.15 6 And recently, a new display
was added to the Terezin concentration camp, describing the internment of
ethnic Germans there after the War.' 57 All of this would have been unthinkable
in the not-too-distant past.
The increased interest in the expulsions was caused in part by the
Czech Republic's accession to the European Union in 2004. That process gave
the expelled and their heirs occasion to tell the world what happened. Although
no European Union government favored linking the Czech Republic's
accession to its repudiation of the Beneg Decrees and restitution of the
expropriated property, the accession process at the very least helped start the

153
See Ian Willoughby, Czech Police Investigation Names Two Responsible for June 1945
Murder of Sudeten Germans, RADIO PRAHA
(June 2,
2009, 4:50
PM),
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/czech-police-investigation-names-two-responsible-forjune-1945-murder-of-sudeten-germans.
154
See David Vaughn, Radka Denemarkova and the Importance ofDigging Up Skulls, RADIO
PRAHA (Jan. 17, 2010, 2:01 AM), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/books/radka-denemarkova-andthe-importance-of-digging-up-skulls; see also Money from Hitler, 9VANDOVO THEATRE,
http://www.svandovodivadlo.cz/index.php?cmd=event.detail&id=1522&lang-en
(last visited
Sept. 27, 2013). The dissident movement during the communist times was dominated by theater
and literary figures including VAclav Havel himself, who enjoyed world-wide critical acclaim as
a playwright before becoming known as a human rights advocate. Id.
1s5
See Ian Willoughby, Plans Underway for First Czech Museum Dedicated to Former
German Speaking Minority, RADIO
PRAHA
(Sept.
16,
2010,
2:46
PM),
http://www.radio.czlen/section/curraffrs/plans-underway-for-first-czech-museum-dedicated-toformer-german-speaking-minority. The museum will be built in Jsti nad Labem, the same town
where in June 1945, ethnic Germans were thrown from the bridge to their deaths. Id.
156
See Chris Johnstone, Executing Justice in the Retributions after WWII, RADIO PRAHA (NOV.
7, 2010, 2:01 AM), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/books/executing-justice-in-the-retributionsafter-wwii (interviewing Benjamin Frommer about his book, National Cleansing: Retribution
Against Nazi Collaboratorsin Postwar Czechoslovakia).
1s7
In both 2010 and 2011, I accompanied a group of American law students through a tour of
Terezin. By happenstance, we were accompanied by the same tour guide in both years. In both
years, the tour ended within fifty yards of a small building that houses the memorial to the ethnic
Germans intemees. In neither year was the memorial, or the fact that ethnic Germans were held
captive there, mentioned on the tour. But in 2011, unlike 2010, the guide encouraged us to
explore the small building and suggested that we would find more history of the camp there.
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public conversation. 58 President Klaus recently re-fueled the conversation by
refusing to ratify the Lisbon amendments to the European Union treaty, which
guarantee property and other rights for citizens of Union countries, unless the
Czech Republic could adopt a protocol stating expressly that the amendments
did not create a justiciable right of action. 5 9 Klaus openly admitted he wanted
the protocol in order to prevent restitution claims by the expelled. 160
The change is also due in part to the active work of non-governmental
organizations such as AntiKomplex, a group of young scholars who are intent
on restoring to the Czech Republic part of the rich culture it lost because of the
expulsions.16 ' AntiKomplex has taken upon itself the remarkable task of
entering dozens of small villages ethnically cleansed between 1945 and 1948 to
facilitate discussions in public fora about what happened. 162 It has helped
several towns in the former Sudentenland establish memorials to the expelled
and killed. 1 It also made extensive presentations in schools throughout the
region, and held festivals celebrating ethnic German and Czech culture.
AntiKomplex's name is suggestive of its purpose: to help overcome the
psychological complex that burdens both the dispossessed and the
dispossessors, as well as their heirs.
The polling data showing changing views among Czechs, and the
vastly greater attention paid to the expulsions in the Czech media, suggest that
the social construction of unworthiness is changing in the Czech Republic with
regard to the ethnically German Czechoslovaks who were dispossessed.
Three Restitution Stories

C.

1.

Karel Des Fours Walderode and Johanna Kammerlander

Born in 1904, Karel Des Fours Walderode came from an aristocratic
family and lived on a substantial rural estate. 165 He was a resident of Bohemia
and became a Czechoslovak citizen when the country came into existence in
1918.166 A census taken that year attempted to determine the ethnicity of
See Waters, supranote 146, at 65.
'
Czechs Might Delay Croatia's EU Entry, PRAGUE DALY MONITOR (June 29, 2011),
http://praguemonitor.com/201 1/06/29/In-czechs-might-delay-croatias-eu-entry.
160
id.
161 Interview with Ondej Mat6jka, Manager of AntiKomplex, in Prague, Czech Republic
(June 2011) (on file with author).
162
id
158

163

Id.

164

Id

165

Id

Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, in Prague, Czech Republic (July 2011) (on file
with author).
166
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Czechoslovakia's inhabitants. Ethnicity was determined by reference to
inhabitants' first language.167 As a child, Walderode grew up speaking Czech,
German, and French.' 68 When the census-taker asked Karel's father what the
boy's first language was, his father explained that the Karel spoke three
languages equally well.169 The census-taker insisted that he needed to record a
first language for purposes of the census, so his father proposed a test: they
would place an apple on the table, call Karel in and ask him in Latin (which he
had also studied) what the object was.170 Whichever language he answered in
would be his first language, and thus his ethnicity, for purposes of the
census. ' Karel identified the object in German: "Apfel."l 72 That moment had a
profound effect on his life.
With the Nazi occupation, because he had been identified as an ethnic
German, Walderode was automatically made a citizen of the German Reich. 73
During the occupation, Walderode's father died and he inherited the family
property.174 According to the testimony of several ethnic Czechs, Walderode
secretly supported Czech resistance activities by allowing resistance groups to
store weapons on his estate, where the Nazis were unlikely to search, and to
listen clandestinely to radio broadcasts there.175 Walderode was also given a
position with an arms manufacturer. However, Protectorate authorities grew
suspicious of him. He was fired from his position and drafted into the
Wehrmacht as a common soldier instead.17 6 Walderode completed basic
training and was about to leave for combat in North Africa when, for reasons
that were never explained, he received a second draft notice.17 7 Walderode
guessed that his personnel record had been filed under both "W" for Walderode
and "D" for Des Fours, but regardless of the reason for the mistake, he was
somehow drafted twice.' 78 Hoping to avoid combat in North Africa, Walderode
took a risk and reported for basic training again. 179 His gamble paid off. The
mistake was not caught, and this time, because he was fluent in several

167
168

id
id

169

id

170

id

171

Id.
Id.

172

173

Id.

174

id.

175

Id

176

Id

179

Id
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languages, Walderode was assigned to an interpreter's company.so While
working as an interpreter for a Protectorate Tribunal, Walderode passed
confidential information to Czech defendants, according to the testimony of
those he aided.18 1
When German forces were driven from Czechoslovakia, Walderode
stayed behind and was arrested.182 However, Walderode was neither stripped of
his citizenship nor expelled from Czechoslovakia because, with the testimony
of ethnic Czechs in the resistance, he was able to prove that he had actively
resisted the occupation, as required under the Beneg Decrees.183 Nonetheless,
under those same Decrees, all of his real property was permanently
expropriated, solely because of his German ethnicity.18 4
Following the communist takeover in 1948, Walderode was targeted.
He was, after all, an aristocrat who had just proven his loyalty to the
government the communists had overthrown. In 1949, he was warned that he
was about to be arrested and fled the country.' 85 As a consequence of leaving
the country without permission, he was stripped of his citizenship by the
communist regime.' 86 Without other assets, he went to the last property still in
his legal possession: a plot of land in rural Sardinia, which according to family
legend had been won in a card game.' 87 He lived there for 16 years before
settling in Vienna.' 88 After the Velvet Revolution, Walderode returned to
Prague as a permanent resident. After having been stripped of citizenship by
the communist regime for fleeing the country in 1949, he re-obtained
citizenship in 1992.
Walderode appeared to be one of the exceedingly rare ethnic Germans
who could meet the stringent requirements for restitution under the 1992
restitution laws: he was a permanent resident of the country, he had been a
citizen when he was dispossessed, he was a citizen at the time he would submit
a claim, and he had retained his citizenship immediately after the occupation by
proving his active loyalty during it. Therefore, in November 1992, he submitted
his claim for restitution. His claim was approved by the Land Office' 89 on

180

Id.

181 Id.
182

id

18

Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 2.2.
Id; Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, supra note 166.
Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, supra note 166.
Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 2.2.

184
185
186
187

1

id.
Id.

189 Id. The administrative entity under the Czech Minister of Agriculture was empowered by
the 1992 law to decide such claims.
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March 10, 1993.190 On September 29, 1993, Walderode's property was restored
to him, 48 years after it had been seized under the Beneg Decrees.
Walderode's restitution was the subject of intense political controversy.
In particular, then Prime Minister, now President Vdclav Klaus was outraged
by the Walderode decision. Klaus wrote to the Land Office stating that
Walderode's restitution was "legal" but "unacceptable" and must be
overturned. 191 When the Land Office refused to overturn its decision, Klaus's
Minister of Agriculture annulled it, purportedly because of doubts about
Walderode's permanent residence in the Czech Republic.1 92
Walderode appealed the annulment to the Czech High Court, but just
two weeks after he filed the appeal, while it was still pending, the Czech
Parliament amended the 1992 restitution law, adding a new requirement for
claimants: not only must a claimant currently be a citizen of the Czech
Republic, but his citizenship must have been uninterruptedbetween 1945 and
1990. Walderode could not qualify for restitution under the amended law,
because his citizenship had been stripped by the communist government while
he was in exile.193 The law was commonly referred to as Lex Walderode in the
press because it was understood as having been created specifically to render
Walderode ineligible for restitution. 19 4 On March 3, 1996, the Land Office
applied Lex Walderode to Walderode's claim.195 At age 92, Walderode's
property was again taken from him.196
Walderode then petitioned the United Nations Human Rights
Committee for redress.' 97 He argued that the Czech Republic had violated his
civil and political rights to equal protection under Article 26 of the International

190 Id. In 1993, through what is commonly known as the Velvet Divorce, Czechoslovakia
divided itself into two countries: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The restitution
programs continued in both countries following the division.
191
See Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 2.4. President Klaus has become a
favorite among some legal scholars in the United States because of his embrace of neo-classical
law and economics. For example, he recently gave the keynote address at a conference
celebrating the birthday of University of Chicago law professor Gary Becker. See VAclav Klaus,
President, Czech Republic, Keynote Address at the University of Chicago Law School
Conference
Honoring
Gary
S.
Becker
(Feb.
11,
2011),
available at
http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/2769. During his speech, Klaus spoke of the need for minimum state
intervention into private affairs. Id.
192
Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, supra note 166. Walderode's residency had not
previously been a controversial matter, and the basis of the Minister's alleged doubts was
unexplained.
193
Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 2.3, 2.7.
194
195
196
197

Id. at para. 2.7.
Id at para. 2.7.
Id at para. 2.7, 3.1; Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, supra note
166.
Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.' 98 While waiting for the Committee's
decision,' 99 Karel Des Fours Walderode died. 2 00 His case was continued by his
widow, Johanna Kammerlander. 20 1
In 2000, the Human Rights Committee held that the Lex Walderode's
requirement of citizenship-let alone uninterrupted citizenship-was a
violation of Article 26's requirement of equal protection and
nondiscrimination. 202 It stated that the Czech Republic should provide
Kammerlander with "prompt restitution of the property in question or
compensation therefor." 03 Armed with that decision, Kammerlander petitioned
the Czech Constitutional Court to overturn the Land Office decision revoking
Walderode's restitution award.204
Reviewing Kammerlander's petition, the Czech Constitutional Court
disagreed with the Human Rights Committee that Lex Walderode violated the
Czech Republic's obligations under international law, but ruled that it could not
be applied retroactively to claims that had been filed before Lex Walderode was
passed-in other words, Lex Walderode could not be applied to Walderode's
own restitution claim.205 In addition, the Czech Constitutional Court held that
the permanent residency requirement-which the Minister of Agriculture had
used to annul Walderode's initial restitution award-was invalid.206 As a result,
the Czech Constitutional Court held that Walderode's restitution claim was still
viable, but Kammerlander would have to follow the normal appeals process for
Land Office decisions through the Czech court system.207 Twenty years after
they were first submitted Karel Des Fours Walderode's claims are still winding
their way through Czech courts.

Id. at para. 1. Better known as the Helsinki Accords, the Covenant was signed in 1975 by
the United States, the Soviet Union, and most other European countries (as they existed at that
time). In return for recognition of permanent boundaries and economic cooperation, the
signatories pledged to honor certain civil and political rights. The Accords played an important
role in the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime; dissidents gained significant political and
moral sympathy by arguing that their only request was that the communist regime honor the
commitments it had made under the Accords. Id.
199 Decisions by the UNHRC are known as "communications."
200
Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 1; Interview with Johanna Kammerlander,
supra note 166.
201 Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 1.
202 Id. at para. 8.3.
203 Id. at para. 9.2.
204 Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, supra note 166.
205
Des Fours Walderode, supra note 131, at para. 2.7 & 8.3; Interview with Johanna
Kammerlander, supra note 166.
206
Des Fours Walderode, supra note 13 1, at para. 5.9.
207 Interview with Johanna Kammerlander, supra note 166.
198
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Robert Brok

Robert Brok was 22 years old when the Nazis arrived in Prague.
Because he was a Jew, his property was immediately expropriated.2 08 His
family's business was given to a privately-owned company that manufactured
tires for the Wehrmacht.2 09 Like most of Prague's Jews, Brok was shipped to
the Terezin concentration camp. 2 10 Terezin was a holding pen behind the fagade
of a ghetto, used by the Nazis as a way station on the tracks to extermination. 211
Like most of Terezin's inmates, Brok was eventually shipped to Auschwitz. 2 12
Unlike most Czechoslovak Jews sent to Auschwitz, Robert Brok returned.213
He survived for one very specific reason: he was number 724 on Oskar
Schindler's famous list of forced laborers.2 14
Upon his return, Brok discovered that his family's property had been
seized by the Czechoslovak government from the company to which the Nazis
had given it.2 15 Brok tried to recover the property under two legal theories.
First, he argued that because it had been taken from him because of racial
persecution, it was a void transfer under the Beneg Decrees.216 Second, Brok
argued that the Bened Decrees had rendered the transfer of his property to the
collaborationist tire manufacturer void, and therefore rendered void the Bene§
government's expropriation of the property from that manufacturer.2 17 He lost
in a decision affirmed by the Czechoslovak Supreme Court. 2 18 The Court held
that the Bene Decrees were not intended to render void expropriations by the
Czechoslovak government; they were intended to divest collaborators.219
Because Brok's former property had been expropriated by the Czech

208

Id. at 4.

209

id
Id.

210

supra note 64, at 444.
Of the approximate 139,000 inmates of Terezin, some 87,000 were shipped to camps in the
east, primarily to Auschwitz and Treblinka. Of the remaining 53,000, 34,000 died at Terezin
before they could be shipped elsewhere. Patrick Macklem, Rybna 9, Praha 1: Restitution and
Memory in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 16 EUR. J.INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2005).
213
According to best estimates, approximately 1,500 inmates from Terezin shipped to
Auschwitz survived the war. Id. at 5.
214
On Schindler's List, he is identified as a Czech Jew manual laborer named "Robert Brock."
SCHINDLER'S LIST, http://www.oskarschindler.com/list.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
215
Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 774/1997, Brok & Brokov: v. Czech Republic,
U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/774/1997 [hereinafter Brokova]; Macklem, supra note 212, at 8.
216 Brokovd, supra note 215, at para. 2.2.
217
Id. at para. 2.2-2.3.
218
Id. at para. 2.3.
219
Id. at para. 2.4.
211

A HISTORY OF THE CZECH LANDS,

212

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/8

34

Edwards: The Paradoxes of Restitution
THE PARADOXES OF RESTITUTION

2013]

653

government from a collaborationist entity, it was now outside the scope of the
restitution provision of the Beneg Decrees.
Before Brok could find redress, the communists seized power.
Communist governments were not known for their sympathy to arguments that
the state should transfer property to private parties. The communist regime
assigned the lower floors of Brok's former property to a state-owned
company.220 The upper floors, where Brok and his family had lived, were
converted into rooms for renting. 221 Robert Brok rented and lived in the room
that had been his parents' bedroom. 22 2
Under the communist government, Brok's status as the child of a
middle class family severely limited his employment and education options.223
Moreover, he was a Jew in a country infected with Stalinist anti-Semitism. 224
He was allowed to perform only unskilled labor. 2 2 5 After drifting through a
variety of manual labor jobs, Brok eventually became a doorman at a hotel
directly across from his former property.226
Immediately after the fall of the communist regime, the building was
sold to private investors under the laws of privatization for small businesses. 227
The new owners of the building raised the rent.228 Brok could no longer afford
his room, and he gave it up.229
In 1992, Brok made a claim for restitution of his family's property. 23 0
He lost. Like the court that had denied Brok's claim 40 years earlier, the court
now held that the 1991 racial persecution amendment to the restitution laws
was intended to provide restitution of property seized by the Nazi Protectorate
government, not property seized by the post-War Beneg government under the
Beneg Decrees.231 Because Brok's property had been seized from collaborators
under the Beneg Decrees, the court held it was ineligible for restitution under

220

Macklem, supra note 212, at 9.

221

id

222

id.

223

id.

224

Igor Lukes, Robert Slansky: His Trials and Trial 2 (Cold War Int'l History Project,

Working Paper No. 50, 2011); see TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER

AND STALIN 364-65 (2010). In 1951, after Stalin's direct intervention, eleven Jewish former
high-ranking Czechoslovak communist party officials were tried for treason in a show trial laced
with unabashed anti-Semitism. They were executed. Id.
225 Macklem, supra note 212, at 7.
226
id
227

Idati1.

228

id

229

id.

230

Brokova, supra note 215, at para. 2.4.
Id.
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the 1991 amendment.232 Under the court's reasoning, a person whose property
was seized by the Nazis because of his race could receive restitution-unless,
in the meantime, the Nazis had given it to a collaborator, from whom it was
seized under the Beneg Decrees. Brok appealed to the Czech Constitutional
Court, arguing that if the lower court's interpretation of the law was correct,
then the law violated his constitutionally protected property rights.233 The Court
rejected that claim on the basis that he had no property rights to violate in the
absence of a successful restitution claim.2 34
Robert Brok died shortly after the Constitutional Court's ruling. 23 5 His
wife and son brought his case to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee. 23 6 The Committee held that the law impermissibly discriminated
between claimants whose property had been seized by the Nazis and given to
collaborators (and subsequently seized under the Beneg Decrees), and those
whose property was seized by the Nazis but not given to collaborators.2 37 The
Committee stated that the Czech government must either restore the property to
the Broks, or compensate them.238 It did neither. Today, Robert Brok's former
property houses a bar on the lower floor and, on the upper floors, a strip club
called "Nasty's Kabaret and Show Dance" that caters to English and American
tourists.
3.

The Schwarzenbergs

Schwarzenberg Palace stands adjacent to Prague Castle, on a hill high
above the Vltava River. The Schwarzenbergs were an immensely wealthy and
powerful noble family in the Hapsburg line, ethnically German but resident in
the Czech lands for generations, whose noble titles had been stripped upon the
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but whose wealth and influence
remained.2 39 In the inter-war years, the palace was the property of Adolph
Schwarzenberg. 240 Adolph Schwarzenberg was one of the largest private

232
233
234

235

id
Macklem, supra note 212, at 12.
Id. at para. 2.6.
Id. atpara. 1.

Macklem, supra note 212, at 12.
Brokovci, supra note 215, at para. 7.4.
238
Id. at para. 9.
239
Among the properties owned by the Schwarzenbergs in addition to the Schwarzenberg
Palace in Prague was the famous castle at Cesky Krumlov. Court Enables Czech Heiress to
Reopen
Restitution
Claims,
PRAGUE
DAILY
MONITOR
(Feb.
2,
2011),
http://praguemonitor.com/2011/02/02/court-enables-noble-heiress-reopen-restitution-claims.
240
Interviews with Alib6ta Pezoldovd, in Prague, Czech Republic (May 2009 & June 2010)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Pezoldovd Interview].
236

237
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landowners in the country, and sat on the board of the powerful Bohemia
Bank.24 1
Adolph Schwarzenberg despised the Nazis. 24 2 In the wake of the
occupation, he resigned his position on the board of Bohemia Bank in protest
against its 'Aryanization' policy, under which Jewish employees were fired and
the accounts of Jewish customers were frozen.243 He went into exile, eventually
arriving in the United States. 24 4 There he provided support to Jan Masaryk, the
former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister also living in exile in the United States.
In retaliation, all of his properties in the Protectorate, including Schwarzenberg
Palace, were expropriated by the Nazi regime. 2 45 His adult son Jindfich was
arrested by the Germans in 1943 and sent to Buchenwald concentration camp,
where he remained until 1944.246
Upon restoration of the Czechoslovak government, under the Bene§
Decrees, Adolph and Jindfich Schwarzenberg were stripped of their citizenship
because of their German ethnicity. Their properties were expropriated.2 47
Adolph Schwarzenberg challenged both his loss of citizenship and the
expropriation, arguing that he was not ethnically German and had been actively
loyal to the Republic throughout the occupation.248 Jan Masaryk, who had
resumed his duties as Foreign Minister, testified to Schwarzenberg's loyalty. 24 9
Schwarzenberg won, but his property was not returned pending the
government's appeal. In April 1947, the Czechoslovak parliament passed a law
known colloquially as Lex Schwarzenberg, because it targeted the
Schwarzenberg properties specifically.250 It expropriated the Schwarzenberg
properties without compensation and without means of redress. 2 5 1 However,
because the Schwarzenberg properties had already been expropriated under the
Beneg Decrees, the Czechoslovak government was concerned that Lex
Schwarzenberg might not be effective. Therefore, on January 30, 1948, the
Czechoslovak parliament revoked the confiscation under the Bene§ Decrees,
purportedly leaving them expropriated under Lex Schwarzenberg instead.252

241
242
243
244
245
246

id
id
id
id
id.
id.

Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 757/1997, Pezoldovd v. Czech Republic, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/75/D/757/1997 [hereinafter Pezoldov].
247

248

Pezoldovi Interview, supra note 240.

249

id.
Id; Pezoldov, supra note 247, at para. 2.3.

250
251
252

Pezoldova, supra note 247, at para. 2.3-2.7.
Id. at para. 2.3.
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Three weeks later, the communists seized power. The communist
takeover spelled the end of any hope of restitution for the Schwarzenbergs.
Adolph and Jindfich Schwarzenberg, as remnants of the Austrian-Hungarian
nobility, were obvious enemies to the communist regime.25 They lived in exile
for the remainder of their lives. Adolph died in 1950.254
Jindfich had a daughter, Alib6ta, who was born and raised in Vienna.
Jindfich also adopted his nephew Karel Schwarzenberg as his male heir. 2 55
Jindfich died in exile in 1965.
From his home in Austria, Karel Schwarzenberg became a stalwart and
much-respected supporter of Czech dissidents during the communist era.257 In
1977, he became the leader of the International Helsinki Foundation, an NGO
dedicated to monitoring states' compliance (or, rather, lack of compliance) with
the civil and political rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords.258 Karel
Schwarzenberg became a close ally and supporter of Vdclav Havel in the years
preceding the Velvet Revolution.259 When Havel became President in 1989, he
chose Schwarzenberg as his chancellor. 2 60
Following the enactment of the 1990-91 restitution laws, Alib6ta
Pezoldovd (ned Schwarzenberg) sought restitution of the Schwarzenberg
properties. She argued that the properties had been seized by the Nazis due to
the political persecution of her father and grandfather. 2 1 Her claim was
rejected. The Czech courts concluded that the Schwarzenberg properties had
not been seized under the Beneg Decrees and, therefore, were not eligible for
restitution under laws enacted to undo expropriations made under them. Rather,
the Schwarzenberg properties were expropriated under Lex Schwarzenberg, to
which the restitution laws did not apply.2 62

253 Moreover, the Schwarzenbergs' most active supporter, Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, was
found dead at the base of the Foreign Ministry within two weeks of the communist takeover.
Masaryk had refused to resign his post. Jan Velinger, The Life and Death ofJan Masaryk, RADIO
PRAHA (July 14, 2004), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/czechs/the-life-and-death-of-jan-masaryk.
His death was declared a suicide by the communist government. Id.
254

PezoldovA Interview, supra note 240.

255

Id

256

id.

257

JERI LABER, COURAGE OF STRANGERS: COMING OF AGE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 341 (2002).
258
DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL NORMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM 4 (2001).
259
LABER, supra note 257, at 328.
260

Id. at 336.

261

PezoldovA Interview, supra note 240.
Pezoldowi, supra note 247, at para. 2.7-2.11.
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Pezoldovd brought her case before the United Nations Human Rights
Committee.26 3 She made two arguments. First, she argued that applying Lex
Schwarzenberg to her family alone made her unequal before the law in
violation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Second, she argued that she had been denied access to the relevant files
that would permit her to prove her family's property was seized under the
Beneg Decrees. That meant she had been denied equal access to a remedy for
the violation of her rights, also in violation of Article 26.26 The Czech
government did not deny that she had been denied access to the relevant
files.265
The Committee held that because Pezoldovi had been denied access to
the files, her right to access to justice had been violated under Article 26.266 The
Committee held that she should be permitted to file a new claim for restitution
even though the time for such claims had passed, and this time be given access
to files which might show whether the property had actually been seized first
26 7
under the Beneg Decrees or Lex Schwarzenberg.
Al2b6ta Pezoldovd
continues to pursue her restitution claim.
III. OVERCOMING THE PARADOXES OF RESTITUTION

At first blush, it might seem unlikely to hope that a society would
voluntarily assume responsibility to end the present continuation of past
injustices-but it has happened repeatedly. Following the collapse of
communism, the Czech Republic did it as a "moral matter" for those socially
constructed as worthy of property rights-respect. Similarly, South Africa has
adopted an extensive restitution program after the fall of the apartheid regime,
even though the post-apartheid democratic government was most certainly not
causally responsible for the massive dispossessions that occurred under
apartheid. Germany has also shown continued commitment to making amends
voluntarily for the crimes of its Nazi government. 2 68
Each of these states has voluntarily accepted collective responsibility to
undo past harms through restitution because doing so is central to its vision of
itself as a liberal democratic state committed to justice. Such states can shape
their moral identities by altering present relationships that have been
determined by past injustices, so that historical effects that undermine their
present moral aspirations are eliminated as far as possible. The willingness of a

263

See id.

264

Id. at para. 3.6, 7.1.
Id. at para. 11.4.
Id. at para. 11.6.
Id. at para. 12.2.
Elazar Barkan, Between Restitution andInternationalMorality, 25

265
266
267

268

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S-

46, S-47 (2001).
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society to define itself through the voluntary acceptance of collective
responsibility-in essence to state, "through his act, we define our moral
identity"-both embodies and reinforces an ethic of civic and moral
responsibility that benefits society itself.
In order for restitution to become possible, then, the dispossessed must
"become" rights-worthy before too much time passes. In order for the
dispossessed to become rights-worthy, those who have been placed outside the
category of rights-respect must be welcomed inside it instead. We can help that
process by promoting the rights-worthiness of the dispossessed.
The process of promoting rights-worthiness is similar in many ways to
what post-conflict literature identifies as "social reconciliation."269 Social
reconciliation programs "seek to promote tolerance and create 'mutual
respect."' 270 As time passes and the intensity of anger and sharpness of
traumatic memory fades, the social construction of rights-worthiness changes.
As that happens, it becomes possible to engage in processes of reconciliation;
as the processes of reconciliation occur, the rights-worthiness of the other is
promoted. They become mutually reinforcing dynamics. In this way, social
reconciliation is a necessary antecedent to property rights restitution.
Often the first step in the process of social reconciliation is establishing
a means of avoiding further violence. However, where the conflict is further in
the past and where ethnic cleansing has removed one group from a society,
there is no danger of immediate violence. Thus one "advantage"- if that word
can be used in this context-of mass dispossessions of ethnic cleansing is that
the potential for immediate future violence is vastly reduced. On the other
hand, the particularly poisonous residue of ethnic cleansing is that it can make a
community based in reconciliation almost impossible, because it destroys the
basis of community-the presence of the other.
The processes of reconciliation can take several forms that are contextspecific; an instructive example is the experience of Japanese-Americans. As
the intensity of anger and trauma faded over time, a concerted effort of political
and legal advocacy on behalf of Japanese-Americans was begun. From that
effort, consciousness about the treatment of Japanese-Americans was raised in
the general population, which fueled a process of reassessment of their rightsworthiness. As Martha Minow recounts, "The political movement for
reparations and the legal struggle to undo the convictions for individuals such
as Fred Korematsu occasioned national debate and education. Museums held
exhibits and offered days of remembrance to commemorate the suffering of
those who had been interned." 2 7 1 The movement was not without resistance. As
Minow recounts, a United States Senator tried to tie reparations for Japanese269

KRISHNA KUMAR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., PROMOTING SOCIAL RECONCILIATION IN

POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 1 (1999).
270

id.

271

MINOW, supra note 26, at 100-01.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/8

40

Edwards: The Paradoxes of Restitution
THE PARADOXES OFRESTITUTION

2013]

659

Americans to reparations from Japan for the families of Americans killed at
Pearl Harbor, apparently still unwilling or unable to recognize that JapaneseAmericans belong to the American national community, not the Japanese.2 72
But with sustained effort, that view was discredited, and ultimately the United
States recognized that Japanese-Americans were within the community of those
due property rights-respect. Public concern that Japanese-Americans' rights
had been violated could only arise if, consciously or unconsciously, the public
had decided that Japanese-Americans were worthy of such rights.
A critical step in the process of promoting rights-respect for JapaneseAmericans was simply making available to the public objectively accurate
accounts of their treatment.273 In many post-conflict societies, commissions
have been established and tasked with determining the historical truth.274
"Harms that are intrinsically historical-which cannot be separated from the
way people view from their history-call for a reparative response that
addresses history." 2 75 The result of dispossession is what Bernadette Atuahene
calls "property-induced invisibility."276 The dispossessed are removed "from
the social contract. The consequence is more than just the taking of real
property, but also the destruction of their relationship to society....
[I]nvisibility is a type of social death." 2 7 7 Stories that express the essential
humanity of victims help to restore their social visibility. In a sense, as the
social construction of the wrongfully dispossessed changes, such that their
humanity is recognized, they re-emerge from the world of things into the living
world of beings.
Once the dispossessed "become" worthy of property rights-respect, the
conversation must become about what forms of restitution are possible. As
Barkan says, most restitution programs occupy "a space between a moral
aspiration and resignation to political limitations."2 78 With that in mind, there
are two general discourses about restitution: "as restoration" and "as

272
273

274

Id. at 100.
Id.
See PRISCILLA

B. HAYNER,

UNSPEAKABLE

TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE

(2d. ed. 2010) (recounting the experiences of truth
commissions in Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Philippines, Chile, Nepal, Chad,
Germany, El Salvador, Haiti, South Africa, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nigeria, South Korea, Panama,
Peru, Ghana, Paraguay, Morocco, Canada, and Greensboro, North Carolina, among others).
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS

275

THOMPSON, supranote 40, at 66.

276

Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparation to Restoration:Moving Beyond Restoring Property
Rights to Restoring Politicaland Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1419, 1431 (2007). She
defines property-induced invisibility as "the confiscation or destruction of real property with no
payment ofjust compensation, executed such that dehumanization occurs." Id.
277
Id. at 1424-25.
278 Barkan, supra note 268, at S-49.
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reconciliation." 279 For those who see restoration as the only acceptable remedy,
the wrongfully dispossessed must be placed in the same position they would
have been in had they not been wronged, because only material restoration can
undo the actual injustice of wrongful dispossession. For those who see
reconciliation as the goal, there must be acts of contrition sufficient so that the
parties are able to live in harmony and mutual respect; material restoration is a
means of making reconciliation possible, and is only as necessary as required to
achieve that goal. Restoration is sometimes said to be backward-looking, in that
it attempts to undo past harms; reconciliation is said to be forward-looking, in
that it attempts to create conditions which will allow the disputants to live
peacefully in the future,280 part of "the larger project of restoring a dispossessed
group or individual's relationship to society." 2 8 1
Law provides a powerful arena in which reconciliation can occur. It
can provide a forum through which historical facts are acknowledged and
personal stories revealed. It can also be used to fashion a wide range of specific
remedies in addition to, or in lieu of, full restoration: public acknowledgement
of the truth, apology, memorials, and symbolic compensation for the
wrongfully dispossessed or the secondarily dispossessed. These lesser remedies
matter. "Quite apart from any attempt genuinely to compensate victims or
offset their losses, reparations may symbolize a society's undertaking not to
forget or deny that a particular injustice took place, and to respect and help
sustain a dignified sense of identity-in-memory for the people affected." 28 2 For
example, while the amounts paid to the Japanese-Americans were not nearly
enough to offset their losses of property, opportunity, community, and
psychological peace, that was not the point. As Waldron describes, the point of
payments to Japanese-Americans interned in concentration camps during
World War 1I "was to mark-with something that counts in the United Statesa clear public recognition that this injustice did happen, that it was the
279
THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 47-48. The same word, reconciliation, is often used to
describe both the process of restoring mutual respect, and the end goal of that process. THE
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 186 (2009),
available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guidingprinciples full.pdf (citing JUDY
BARSALOU & VICTORIA BAXTER, THE URGE TO REMEMBER, U.S. INST. OF PEACE,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/srs5.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2013)). As Thompson uses the
term here, it refers to the end goal of the process described above. I understand it as a state in
which those who were in conflict regard each with mutual rights-respect.
280
See BROPHY, supra note 32, at 8 ("Backward-looking relief seeks to assess the exact harm
of the past and compensate for it. Proponents of forward-looking relief, in contrast, recognize
that past harm is having some continuing effect on the present, but they make little effort to
assess the exact value of those past harms. In place of an exact calculation of past harm, they
seek some compensation that attempts to improve lives into the future .... Forward-looking
relief seems to be the dominant form among reparations proponents, for it provides flexibility in
choosing the type and size of remedy.").
281 Atuahene, supra note 276, at 1424.
282 Waldron, supra note 3, at 6.
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American people and their government that inflicted it, and that these people
were among its victims."283 Moreover, Waldron argues that "[i]t is no objection
to this that the payments are purely symbolic" because "identity is bound up
with symbolism" and "a symbolic gesture may be as important to people as any
material compensation. ,,284
In addition to material compensation, apology may become possible.
Many victims of violence report that apology is the most important remedy to
them, perhaps because it embodies within it an acknowledgement of the rightsworthiness of the victim. Sometimes, contrition can help lay the ground work
for forgiveness.
Forgiveness is said to benefit victims, perpetrators, and divided
societies. It can end cycles of violence, help victims reestablish
their own dignity, redeem wrongdoers as persons worthy of
forgiveness, renew civic relationships between victims and
perpetrators, and allow bystanders to realize their own roles in
the past. Forgiveness helps societies to overcome, though not
forget the past and thus make possible progress to the future.285
For example, in David and Choi's remarkable study of the willingness
of former political prisoners to forgive those responsible for the fact and
conditions of their imprisonment, the second strongest variable positively
associated with forgiveness was an apology from their captors. Apology was
more important to forgiveness than the length and conditions of imprisonment;
the subsequent individual, social, or political empowerment of the wronged
party; or the punishment of the wrongdoer.286 Some material compensation,
combined with acknowledgement, apology, and forgiveness, may complete the
process of reconciliation. 287
"Reparatory justice is not merely about the restitution of property or
the payment of compensation to former owners. Such schemes ... have a
wider, normative significance; they help to shape collective memory and
national identity . . . .. 288 It is in that sense that "laws of restitution are another

283

Id at 7.

284

id.

285

BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT (Nigel
Biggar, ed., 2003); DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 226 (1999); Roman
David & Susanne Y. P. Choi, Forgiveness and TransitionalJustice in the Czech Republic, 50 J.
CONFLICT RES. 339, 340 (2006) (citing MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS (1998)).
286 David & Choi, supra note 285, at 359. The only variable more positively related with

forgiveness than apology by the captors was frequency of church attendance by the captives. Id.
287

Id. at 354.

288

Poginy, supranote 80, at 399.
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chapter in this reconstruction of, and search for, a national self." 28 9 A nation
constructing a national self that is committed to justice may have to "make
reparations for its past wrongs-including wrongs that were done in past

generations." 29 0
Far from being unjust, acceptance of collective responsibility becomes
an active affirmation of the centrality of justice in a society's identity. As
Hanoch Dagan has argued, "[A] regime of 'moral retroactivity' anticipates and
encourages" a citizenry committed to justice: "rather than undermining law's
legitimacy, retroactive application of core human rights ends up presenting law
at its best: as a perennial quest for justice."29 1
The stories of Karel Des Fours Walderode, Johanna Kammerlander,
Robert Brok, and the Schwarzenbergs demonstrate the need for restitution
remedies, the need for flexibility in fashioning them, and their importance not
only to the dispossessed but also to the identities and aspirations of secondary
dispossessors.
Walderode himself has died, and therefore the strength of his personal
tie to his former property has largely dissolved; there is no longer a need to
restore it to him because of its connection to his sense of his own identity. And
yet, given the tenacity with which he fought for his property throughout his life,
it clearly was part of his life's work to preserve his connection to it. That
should and can be honored. Moreover, the Czechs own identity as a people
committed to justice and the rule of law should motivate them to provide
restitution in some form to Walderode. The extra-legal machinations involved
in annulling his initial restitution award were unseemly and disgraceful; Lex
Walderode is a blemish on the Czech lawmaking system. The Czechs own
moral aspirations are best served by affording him the dignity of at least partial
restoration. They should also publicly acknowledge that he was wronged, and
perhaps construct some type of memorial on his former property
acknowledging his contributions and loyalty to the Czech Republic.
Robert Brok has died and his restitution claim is no longer being
pursued. During his life, the intensity of his connection to his former property,
and the centrality of to his own sense of identity, could hardly be overstated.
After all, even when his restitution claim was unjustly denied, he continued to
live in the building as a tenant and worked most of his life as a doorman at the
hotel across from it. Particularly given the depth of his suffering at Terezin and
Auschwitz, it is terrible to think that the property that was so central to his
existence is now degraded into a strip club for Western tourists. 2 9 2 Given its
Id. (quoting Shlomo Avineri, A Forum on Restitution, 2:3 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 34, 37
(1993)).
289
290

THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 68.

291 Hanoch
Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification,
IntergenerationalJustice, andLegal Transitions,84 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1173 (2004).
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See supra Part II.C.2.
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location in Josefski, Prague's former Jewish district, it would be an excellent
site for a memorial to the vanished Jewish population of Prague. 29 3 Brok's story
could and should be told there. And again, the Czechs should be motivated to
make at least those amends not solely because of what is owed to Brok, but also
because of their own moral aspirations and commitment to an identity as a
liberal and pluralistic democratic state. And, to the extent that Brok's
descendants have been impoverished by his unjust treatment, they must be
compensated and made whole.
In many ways, the Schwarzenbergs' story could not be more different
than Brok's. The property of which they were dispossessed is not a nondescript
building now used as a strip club; it is the most prominent palace in Prague.
The Schwarzenbergs were not impoverished by the unjust expropriation of their
properties. But the ferocity with which Al2b6ta Pezoldovi, now 66, pursues
restitution even today speaks volumes about the painful effect of injustice.
The Schwarzenbergs were unjustly deprived of their property even
though Adolph Schwarzenberg supported the Czechoslovak government in
exile, and Jindfich Schwarzenberg was sent to Buchenwald for his opposition
to the Nazi regime. It is the bitterness of that thought that lingers. It is of course
simply unrealistic to think that a palace now treated as national treasure will be
returned to private ownership. But all personal property tied to Ms. Pezoldova's
father and grandfather should be restored to her. And, again, the
Schwarzenbergs' stories should be told and honored. Not just their loyalty to
the Republic during its occupation, but also the unjust way in which they were
treated by the Republic during the Beneg years.
These, of course, are just three stories. In the Czech Republic, there are
tens of thousands of individual stories untold and unknown. In the world
beyond the Czech Republic, including in the United States, there are millions.
The Czech Republic is rightly regarded as a model of peaceful
transformation, and its restitution program for the victims of communism was
so extensive precisely because it was, for the Czechs, a moral matter. The
Czech restitution program is remarkable on many levels. Attempting any
restitution program at all in the face of such tumultuous history is a remarkable
testament to the Czech people's determination to emerge from history. The
program's unusual commitment to restoration as the remedy of first resort
defied conventional wisdom that doubted such a program could work. Its huge
economic cost was worth bearing because it was central to Czech moral
identity and aspirations. But the Czech restitution program also reveals, by who
it ignores, that the corrosive effects of time cannot alone explain refusals to
provide restitution. Rather, restitution also depends upon overcoming the
debilitating effects of the social construction of unworthiness.
Of course, the Czech Republic is not the only society with unaddressed
restitution issues-in the United States, our own history of ethnic cleansing and
293

See supra Part II.C.2.
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wrongful dispossession remains an unhealed wound. But perhaps, as it did in
1989, the Czech Republic can provide a moral light for others to follow.
IV. CONCLUSION

To overcome the paradoxes of restitution and embrace an identity as a
people committed to justice, it is necessary that two things happen: we must
acknowledge that the dispossessed were human beings worthy of property
rights-respect, and we must assume, collectively, the responsibility to overcome
the effects of that unaddressed injustice-restoring rights where it is possible
and morally justified, making other amends where it is not. And all of this must
happen before time renders justice impossible.
The process of restitution can be both incredibly powerful and
dangerous. Powerful, because it is a tool that can be used to re-structure history
itself. Dangerous, because in doing so, it might damage the present and the
future. Finding the right balance is difficult. The law has a role to play: not as
the determinant of outcomes through the application of rigid formulas, but as
an institution nearly as adaptable and flexible as the needs of justice. Legal
institutions provide a forum through which we can decide, to the best of our
honest ability, what is historically true. And, in the light of historical truth, law
empowers us to give effect to the most just course of action possible.
Political limitations cannot be ignored; in some cases, peace may
depend upon observing them. But we also must recognize that where political
limitations are caused by socially constructed and imposed unworthiness, they
may (and very likely, will) change in time. If that is true, then we can do two
things: encourage that change and prepare our institutions so that they are ready
when it occurs.
Beyond its immediate horrors, mass dispossession is an amputation
performed on the future. It diminishes the lives of the dispossessed and their
heirs, and the dispossessors and their heirs. The heartbreak, and the smoldering
corrosive effect of injustice, is palpable. It can only be overcome by assuming
collective responsibility to make amends.
Precisely because the assumption of collective responsibility in such
circumstances is neither required nor expected, it is an act outside the current of
history that ends the continuous move and countermove of historical conflict. It
is the end of historical conflict and the chance to begin anew. By assuming
collective responsibility to overcome the legacy of socially constructed rightsunworthiness, we overcome the paradoxes of restitution and author a different
ending.
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